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ABSTRACT
Regulation S provides U.S. issuers with an exemption from the
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 to the extent
that securities are offered and sold solely outside the United States.
Through resales back into the United States, however, U.S. investors
may become exposed to unregistered securities initially distributed
abroad through Regulation S. This Article identifies two distinct risks
from an offshore securities offering. First, issuers may conduct an of-
fering under Regulation S as a means to sell securities indirectly into
the United States through resales in situations where the U.S. secon-
dary market overvalues the issuer’s securities. Second, even where the
U.S. secondary market does not overvalue an issuer’s securities, the
managers of the issuer may utilize Regulation S to engage in self-
dealing and other opportunistic behavior for their own private benefit
at the expense of U.S. investors. Employing a dataset of 701 offerings
conducted pursuant to Regulation S from 1993 to 1997, this Article
presents evidence that insider self-dealing may result in a greater of-
fering discount for certain overseas offerings. Given the specific risks
facing U.S. investors, the Article then argues that the SEC’s 1998 re-
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forms to Regulation S represent only an untailored response. Instead,
the Article recommends specific reforms that both reduce the risk
facing U.S. investors and lessen the regulatory burden on offshore se-
curities offerings that pose little risk of investor abuse.
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INTRODUCTION
Regulation S of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) ex-
empts issuers seeking to sell securities outside the United States from
several requirements of federal securities regulation.1 Adopting a ter-
ritorial approach, Regulation S presents domestic issuers with the
choice to sell securities freely offshore while avoiding the registration
requirements of the Securities Act.2 This choice, however, is not un-
limited; through its focus on offerings outside the United States,
Regulation S binds the U.S. regulatory regime to the U.S. capital
markets. Issuers that desire to utilize Regulation S to avoid U.S.
1. Regulation S encompasses Rules 901 through 905 of the Securities Act of 1933. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.901-905 (2000). The SEC originally adopted Regulation S in 1990. See Offshore
Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6863, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,524, at 80,661 (Apr. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Adopting Release]; see also Guy P.
Lander, Regulation S—Securities Offerings Outside the United States, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 339, 340-94 (1996) (providing a summary of the original Regulation S).
2. Rule 901 states that “[f]or the purposes only of section 5 of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 77e),
the terms offer, offer to sell, sell, sale, and offer to buy . . . shall be deemed not to include offers
and sales that occur outside the United States.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (2000); see also Offshore
Offers & Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6779, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661, at 22,665 (June 17,
1988) [hereinafter Proposed Offshore Offers & Sales] (“The Regulation proposed today is
based on a territorial approach to section 5 of the Securities Act. Under such an approach, the
registration of securities is intended to protect the U.S. capital markets and all investors pur-
chasing in the U.S. market, whether U.S. or foreign nationals.”). Regulation S does not exempt
issuers from any other aspect of the U.S. securities laws, including antifraud provisions under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Preliminary Note 1, Regulation S, Securities Act, 17
C.F.R. § 230.901 (2000); see also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extra-
territoriality of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 215-19 (1996) (discuss-
ing the reach of the U.S. antifraud liability rules overseas).
Section 5 of the Securities Act serves as the focal point for the Securities Act’s registra-
tion requirement for offers and sales of securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994). Commonly known
as the gun-jumping rules, the registration process required under section 5 results in the creation
of an information disclosure document known as the registration statement and the delivery of a
subset of the registration statement, the prospectus, to investors. For most domestic companies,
the registration statement consists of information contained on Form S-1, S-2, or S-3 of the Se-
curities Act. See Forms S-1, S-2, S-3, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (describing Forms S-1, S-2, and S-3). Disclo-
sure made through either the registration statement or the prospectus then comes under height-
ened antifraud liability pursuant to sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e. Importantly, section 5 covers every offer and sale of a security that involves interstate
commerce. Section 2(7) of the Securities Act, in turn, defines interstate commerce to include
“trade or commerce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto . . .
between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia.” Id. § 77b(7).
Obtaining an exemption from section 5, such as through Regulation S, is therefore important for
any transaction to escape the burdens of the registration process.
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regulations must ordinarily do so without access to the U.S. capital
markets.
Despite the territorial relationship between the U.S. regulatory
regime and the U.S. capital markets within Regulation S, the securi-
ties laws afford issuers a potential loophole. Through resales into the
United States, Regulation S allows for unregistered securities sold
abroad to flow back into the United States.3 A U.S. company operat-
ing out of New York, for example, may issue securities pursuant only
to Japanese law through sales in Japan under Regulation S.4 To the
extent that the securities have “come to rest,”5 Japanese investors
may then resell into the United States, exposing investors within the
United States to the risk of purchasing securities unregistered under
the U.S. securities laws.
As originally promulgated, Regulation S guarded against the re-
sale of unregistered securities into the United States by imposing a
restricted period of forty days for equity securities of Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) reporting issuers sold abroad,
during which such securities could not be resold into the United
States.6 Many investors interpreted the forty-day restricted period to
3. The focus of the registration process under section 5 is on particular transactions.
Therefore, overseas investors may escape section 5’s registration requirement and resell into the
United States if they can find an applicable transaction exemption from section 5. Section 4(1)
of the Securities Act provides such an exemption, exempting “transactions by any person other
than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.” Id. § 77d(l).
To the extent that overseas investors can represent that they are not issuers, underwrit-
ers, or dealers, they may resell securities freely into the United States without meeting the regis-
tration requirement of section 5. Id. § 77d(l). The largest hurdle facing overseas investors in us-
ing section 4(1)’s exemption, in turn, is the definition of an underwriter under the Securities
Act. Section 2(a)(11) defines an underwriter to include, among other things, “any person who
has purchased from an issuer with a view to . . . the distribution of any security.” Id. § 77b(11).
Thus, overseas investors that purchase a Regulation S security with the purpose of reselling im-
mediately into the United States are considered underwriters and are denied section 4(1)’s ex-
emption from Regulation S. Absent some other exemption, such overseas investors must meet
the registration requirement of section 5 in their resales into the United States.
4. Whether Japanese law applies to securities offerings inside Japan, of course, is a matter
of Japanese law. See Nicole J. Ramsay, Note, Japanese Securities Regulation: Problems of En-
forcement, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S255, S257-65 (1992) (providing a summary of Japanese secu-
rities regulation); see also Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the Market: The Ministry of Finance and
Securities Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INT’L L. 423, 428-44 (1994) (providing a history of
securities regulation in Japan).
5. See Registration of Foreign Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg.
9,828, at 9,828 (July 9, 1964) (“It is assumed in these situations that the distribution is to be ef-
fected in a manner which will result in the securities coming to rest abroad.”).
6. See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 903(c)(2)(iii) (1990). Non-Exchange Act–re-
porting domestic issuers faced a one-year restricted period under the original Regulation S. See
id. § 903(c)(3).
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imply that resales into the United States could commence immedi-
ately after such period expired.7 Despite the forty-day restricted pe-
riod, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documented a
series of abuses under the original Regulation S whereby securities
sold offshore at large discounts ultimately made their way back into
the United States.8 In some cases, foreign investors engaged in short
sales of the issuer’s securities into the United States immediately fol-
lowing the Regulation S offering and then made up their short posi-
The Exchange Act imposes periodic information reporting requirements for certain is-
suers, commonly known as “Exchange Act–reporting companies.” Companies listed on a na-
tional securities exchange must register and comply with the SEC’s periodic information disclo-
sure requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m; id. § 78l(b); id. § 78c(a)(1) (defining “exchange” for the
purposes of the Exchange Act). Similarly, companies whose total assets exceed $10 million and
have a class of equity security (other than an exempted security) held of record by more than
500 shareholders must register the securities under the Exchange Act and thereby come under
the periodic reporting requirements of section 13(a). See id. § 78m (requiring issuers of securi-
ties to file annual reports with the Commission); id. § 78l(g) (mandating an issuer’s registering a
registration statement with the Commission); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (raising the asset
requirement to $10 million).
These required periodic information filings include annual Form 10-K, quarterly Form
10-Q, and occasional Form 8-K documents. See id. § 78m(a) (giving the SEC authority to re-
quire these filings); Regulation 13A, Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1–13a-17 (2000) (pro-
viding rules on periodic disclosure requirements of Exchange Act registered companies); id.  §
249.310 (requirements for Form 10-K); id. § 249.308a (requirements for Form 10-Q); id.  §
249.308 (requirements for Form 8-K). Companies that recently filed a registration statement
that has become effective under the Securities Act must also comply with the periodic reporting
requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
7. Indeed, the SEC in the 1988 Proposing Release seemed to support the view that resales
could commence into the United States after the Original Regulation S restricted period. See
Proposed Offshore Offers & Sales, supra note 2, at 22,665 (“After the foreign distribution has
been completed and the marketing efforts have terminated, routine secondary trading may be-
gin as a matter of course. The periodic reporting requirements of the Exchange Act would pro-
tect investors in the U.S. market by assuring that information concerning the issuer would be
available.”); see also Sara Hanks, Direct Regulation S Offerings and the SEC’s “Problematic
Practices” Release, 2 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 303, 321 (1996) (“The author would suggest that
the restricted period [of the Original Regulation S] raises a presumption against availability of
Section 4(1) during its running, which presumption is reversed on the fortieth day.”).
8. See Problematic Practices Under Regulation S, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7190, 60
Fed. Reg. 35,663, at 35,663 (June 27, 1995) [hereinafter Problematic Practices Release] (de-
scribing a number of harms to U.S. investors from Regulation S offerings); see also Josh Futter-
man, Note, Evasion and Flowback in the Regulation S Era: Strengthening U.S. Investor Protec-
tion While Promoting U.S. Corporate Offshore Offerings, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 806, 840-68
(1995) (discussing “flowback, evasion, and discounting problems since the adoption of Regula-
tion S”); Julie L. Kaplan, Comment, “Pushing the Envelope” of the Regulation S Safe Harbors,
44 AM. U. L. REV. 2495, 2530-41 (1995) (delineating the exploitation of Regulation S and rec-
ommending lengthening the restricted period).
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tion using securities purchased offshore, locking in any discount they
obtained through purchases of offshore securities.9
To combat the possibility of resales into the United States, the
SEC recently instituted new rules imposing numerous additional re-
strictions on Regulation S offerings.10 Promulgated in 1998, the rules
(referred to as the “1998 reforms”), among other things, effectively
increased the period during which offshore investors must wait before
selling equity securities of domestic issuers into the United States.
Under the revised Regulation S, securities sold through Regulation S
are considered “restricted.”11 Investors may not resell restricted
Regulation S securities into the United States unless the transaction is
registered under the Securities Act or satisfies the criteria of an ex-
emption from the registration requirement. One such exemption is
Rule 144 of the Securities Act,12 which allows foreign purchasers to
resell freely inside the United States so long as one full year has
passed since the purchase of the securities, among other
9. Short sales involve investors selling securities they do not own into the market. Me-
chanically, to conduct a short sale investors must borrow the security from an intermediary and
then sell the security into the market. Investors must eventually “cover” their short position at a
later date by purchasing the security again on the open market and then delivering the security
back to the intermediary. Short sales are profitable in situations in which the person engaging in
the short sale expects the stock price to drop.
In a well-publicized case, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order against GFL Ultra
Ltd., a British Virgin Islands investment company. See In re GFL Ultra Fund Ltd., Exchange
Act Release No. 7423, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,949, at 89,752 (June
18, 1997). GFL Ultra had engaged in several purchases of securities sold overseas through
Regulation S typically at a discount of 15-20% of the U.S. secondary market price. Rather than
wait until the expiration of the 40-day restricted period under the original Regulation S, GFL
Ultra immediately engaged in short sales of securities of the issuer inside the United States. At
the end of the 40-day restricted period, GFL Ultra then used its Regulation S securities to cover
its short position. GFL Ultra, therefore, was able to guarantee a profit from its large discount
from the U.S. secondary market price without any risk to itself through its short sale technique.
See id. at 89,753 & n.5 (reporting that the total profit to GFL Ultra was greater than $840,000).
10. See Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7505, 63 Fed. Reg. 9632
(Feb. 25, 1998) [hereinafter Offshore Offers & Sales]. The amendments embodied in Exchange
Act Release No. 33-7505 became effective on April 27, 1998.
11. Rule 144 of the Securities Act defines a “restricted security” to include “[e]quity securi-
ties of domestic issuers acquired in a transaction or chain of transactions subject to the condi-
tions of § 230.901 or § 230.903 under Regulation S.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (2000).
12. Rule 144 provides a safe harbor from the definition of an “underwriter” under the Se-
curities Act for those who attempt to resell restricted securities. To the extent that the condi-
tions of Rule 144 are met, an investor may then use the transaction exemption under section
4(1) of the Securities Act to avoid the registration requirement under section 5 of the Securities
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1994); id. § 77e; 17 C.F.R. § 230.144; see also supra note 3 (discuss-
ing the registration requirements under the Securities Act and the section 4(1) exemption).
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requirements.13 The 1998 reforms also imposed certification,14 leg-
ending,15 and stop-transfer16 restrictions on all Regulation S issuers
and distributors of equity securities.
This Article argues that the SEC’s 1998 reforms provide only an
untailored response to the myriad problems posed through offshore
securities offerings. The value of the SEC’s 1998 reforms and the
need to regulate the use of overseas offerings are inextricably linked
to the risks to U.S. investors from resales of Regulation S unregis-
tered securities into the United States. Armed with more detailed in-
formation on the danger posed through a Regulation S offering,
regulators may implement tailored reforms that both reduce the risk
to U.S. investors and lower the cost of capital for U.S. issuers seeking
to raise capital offshore.
This Article groups the harms from a Regulation S offering into
two theoretically distinct categories. First, managers may act in the
best interests of the issuer’s pre-offering shareholders. In this situa-
tion, managers of an issuer may use Regulation S to sell securities to
foreign investors systematically where the secondary market overval-
ues the securities.17 Through resales, the foreign investors may then
resell such securities to unsuspecting U.S. purchasers, benefiting both
foreign investors and the pre-offering shareholders of the issuer, at
the expense of the new U.S. purchasers.18 Significantly, the vulner-
13. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d). In addition to the one-year holding period, Rule 144 re-
quires several conditions before providing a safe harbor from the definition of an “underwriter”
and, thereby, from the registration requirements of section 5. There must exist current public
information on the issuer and the resale must occur through a “brokers’ transaction,” defined
under section 4(4) of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (making section 77e inapplicable
to “brokers’ transactions executed upon customers’ orders on any exchange or in the over-the-
counter market but not the solicitation of such orders”); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (requiring public
information in form of filed reports); id. § 230.144(f) (outlining manner of sale of brokers’ trans-
actions); id. § 230.144(g) (defining “brokers’ transaction”). As well, the amount of securities that
may be sold in reliance on Rule 144 is limited. See id. § 230.144(e). A notice of the proposed sale
is also required to be filed with the SEC. See id. § 230.144(h). On the other hand, for non-
affiliate investors seeking to conduct a resale after two years from the date of acquisition, Rule
144 removes all of these additional requirements. See id. § 230.144(k).
14. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
17. See Stewart Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 194-95 (1984)
(describing the incentive of managers to sell securities where the secondary market price over-
values the company relative to its fundamental value).
18. Pre-offering shareholders gain to the extent that the issuer is able to take in a greater
amount of offering proceeds due to the market’s overvaluation. Foreign investors benefit to the
extent that they receive a share of the overvaluation amount through an offering discount rela-
tive to the secondary market price U.S. purchasers pay for the securities. For a discussion of
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ability of U.S. purchasers to resales of overvalued Regulation S secu-
rities depends on the accuracy and timing of the secondary market
reaction to news of an offshore offering. Where the secondary market
reacts accurately to news of the Regulation S offering prior to the
commencement of resales into the United States, foreign investors
lose the ability to resell overvalued securities to new U.S. purchasers.
Second, managers may act in their own self-interest through an
offshore offering of securities. The offering discount, for instance,
may represent an outright transfer of value from pre-offering U.S.
shareholders in the issuer to foreign investors. To the extent that the
managers own equity in the issuer, the managers are themselves di-
luted when securities are sold at a discount to foreign investors. Self-
interested managers, therefore, will not ordinarily transfer value away
from their own pre-offering shareholders to prospective foreign inves-
tors. Acting purely out of self-interest, nevertheless, managers may
utilize Regulation S to engage in self-dealing, selling highly dis-
counted securities to offshore entities in which the managers possess
an ownership interest. Managers may also sell discounted securities to
large block shareholders in the company in return for the block
shareholders’ acquiescence to self-interested managerial decisions.
Similarly, managers may engage in sales of securities through Regula-
tion S that raise capital for the issuer not needed for any shareholder
wealth-increasing activity but rather designed to increase the power
and prestige of managers.19
In one of the first empirical studies focusing on offshore securi-
ties offerings, this Article analyzes the magnitude of these potential
harms using empirical evidence obtained from a dataset of Regula-
tion S offerings involving Exchange Act–reporting issuers during the
period from 1993 to 1997. The Article first summarizes evidence that
foreign investors in fact are unable to resell foreign-issued U.S. secu-
rities ahead of the secondary market reaction to news of the offering,
providing little support for the widely held fear that issuers may use
Regulation S to issue overvalued securities indirectly to U.S. purchas-
these issues, see infra Part II.A.2 (analyzing the situation of resales of Regulation S securities
into the United States prior to any secondary market reactions to information on the offering).
19. For example, managers may use the proceeds from a sale to engage in an acquisition
designed to increase the amount of the assets under their control regardless of the value to
shareholders of the acquisition. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41
STAN. L. REV. 597, 599 (1989) (discussing the hypothesis that bidders in a takeover contest pay
too much for the target company). Black writes, “These overpayments don’t cause bidder stock
prices to drop because investors already expect the bidder to waste the money, one way or an-
other.” Id.
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ers.20 The Article then presents evidence that the magnitude of the of-
fering discount in an offshore offering increases with the fraction of
corporate insiders on the board of directors, providing support for the
notion that managers may use Regulation S offerings to transfer value
to foreign investors as a form of self-dealing.21 In addition, the greater
the beneficial ownership of common stock on the part of corporate
officers, the lower is the offering discount. The cost of using Regula-
tion S to engage in self-dealing increases for managers that own a sig-
nificant fraction of a corporation’s equity.
Given the empirical evidence on the possible risks from Regula-
tion S, this Article argues that the specific risks facing U.S. investors
from a Regulation S offering require more tailored reforms that ad-
dress the risks while reducing the restrictions on shareholder wealth-
enhancing offerings. Regulators may wish to adjust the Regulation S
exemption based on the type of issuer, whether the offering is con-
ducted to a large number of purchasers or only a small group of pur-
chasers, and the geographic region of the offering. In addition, more
detailed and timely information disclosure on the identity of the pur-
chasers of a Regulation S offering and the specific use of proceeds
may lessen managerial opportunism risks, enabling regulators to re-
duce the restricted period applied to resales of offshore securities into
the United States.
Part I of this Article provides a summary of the Regulation S of-
fering exemption and the SEC’s recent 1998 reforms. Part II discusses
the theoretical risks U.S. investors confront from a Regulation S of-
fering, and Part III reports this Article’s empirical tests of the magni-
tude of the risks. Part IV then examines the possibility of policy re-
forms for Regulation S.
20. See infra Part II.A (analyzing the risk to U.S. investors from resales of overvalued off-
shore securities into the United States); see also Problematic Practices Release, supra note 8, at
35, 663:
Since the adoption of Regulation S, it has come to the Commission’s attention that
some market participants are conducting placements of securities purportedly off-
shore under Regulation S under circumstances that indicate that such securities are in
essence being placed offshore temporarily to evade registration requirements with the
result that the incidence of ownership of the securities never leaves the U.S. market.
21. See infra Part II.B (analyzing the risk to U.S. investors from the opportunistic use of
offshore offerings of securities to benefit corporate managers).
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I.  SUMMARY OF REGULATION S AND THE IMPACT OF RECENT
SEC REFORMS
The present justification for Regulation S relies on a concept of
nationality that takes the goal of U.S. securities regulation as pro-
tecting American investors and capital markets.22 So long as a securi-
ties transaction occurs within the United States, the U.S. securities re-
gime should apply. If the transaction occurs solely “outside the
United States,”23 following this line of logic, there is no need for secu-
rities regulation to follow, and the offering is exempt from the regis-
tration requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act.24 Regulation S,
in turn, applies different standards for foreign and domestic issuers.
This part discusses the requirements Regulation S places on domestic
U.S. issuers.
Domestic issuers must satisfy a number of requirements, based
on the type of transaction, in order to qualify for the Regulation S
safe harbor.25 Regulation S sets forth three categories of qualifying
transactions, of which two are of primary importance to domestic is-
22. See Proposed Offshore Offers & Sales, supra note 2, at 22,665 (“Principles of comity
and reasonable expectations of participants in the global markets justify reliance on laws appli-
cable in jurisdictions outside the United States to define disclosure requirements for transac-
tions effected offshore.”) (citation omitted).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (2000).
24. See supra note 2 (describing the registration requirements under section 5 of the Securi-
ties Act).
25. In addition to the Regulation S requirements discussed in the text, all Regulation S is-
suers must also meet two basic requirements. First, any offers or sales must be made in an “off-
shore transaction” as defined in Rule 902(h) of the Securities Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h).
Rule 902(h) requires an offshore transaction to meet several prerequisites. Offers of Regulation
S securities may not be made to a person inside the United States. Id. § 230.902(h)(1)(i). In ad-
dition, the transaction must meet one of two alternative requirements. The transaction must be
“executed in, on or through a physical trading floor of an established foreign securities exchange
that is located outside the United States.” See id. § 230.902(h)(1)(ii)(B)(1). In the alternative, at
the time the buy order is originated, purchasers of Regulation S securities must either be outside
the United States or the seller must reasonably believe that the buyer is outside the United
States. See id. § 230.902(h)(1)(ii)(A).
Regulation S issuers must then meet the second basic requirement that sellers cannot
make any “directed selling efforts” inside the United States. Rule 902(c) defines “directed sell-
ing efforts” to include “any activity undertaken for the purpose of, or that could reasonably be
expected to have the effect of, conditioning the market in the United States for any of the secu-
rities being offered.” Id. § 230.902(c). Through the offshore transaction requirement, offers and
sales must involve only prospective investors physically outside the United States. The directed
selling efforts requirement, in turn, restricts preliminary efforts prior to actual offers and sales
from occurring within the United States. Rule 902(c) defines “directed selling efforts” to ex-
clude specified tombstone advertisements as well as information U.S. or foreign law requires
sellers to publish. Id. § 230.902(c)(3).
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suers.26 Those categories represent a policy choice based on two fac-
tors: (a) the type of security issued through Regulation S and, less im-
portantly, (b) the Exchange Act reporting status of the issuer in the
United States.27
Rule 903(b)(2) of the Securities Act establishes the criteria for
the first category of transactions, termed “Category 2” transactions,
through which U.S. issuers and their distributors may avoid section
5’s registration requirements.28 Under this rule, U.S. issuers may en-
gage in a Regulation S offering so long as the issuers are Exchange
Act–reporting companies and offer only debt securities, among other
requirements.29 Rule 903(b)(2) presents the SEC’s only acknowledg-
ment within Regulation S for domestic issuers that the market may
already have detailed information on Exchange Act–reporting com-
panies and that less regulation is thus necessary.30 The acknowledge-
ment, however, is limited to the extent that Rule 903(b)(2) explicitly
restricts itself to debt securities.31
26. Regulation S sets forth a category available to foreign issuers (designated “Category 1”
transactions) where either no substantial U.S. market interest exists in the class of securities
being offered or the securities are sold in an “overseas directed offering,” including offerings to
a single country other than the United States. Id. § 230.903(b)(1). In addition, domestic issuers
of non-convertible debt securities directed to a single foreign country are eligible for Category
1. Id. § 230.903(b)(1)(ii)(B). Issuers of securities offered and sold only to employees of the is-
suer or an affiliate of the issuer pursuant to an employee benefit plan established and adminis-
tered under the law of a foreign country are also eligible for Category 1, among other issuers. Id.
§ 230.903(b)(1)(iv).
27. See supra note 6 (describing the disclosure requirements placed on Exchange Act–re-
porting companies).
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(2). Rule 902(d) defines a “distributor” to mean “any under-
writer, dealer, or other person who participates, pursuant to a contractual arrangement, in the
distribution of the securities offered or sold in reliance on this Regulation S . . . .” Id.  §
230.902(d). Regulation S offerings under Category 2 must also comply with the two basic off-
shore offering and directed selling efforts requirements. See supra note 25.
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(2). For a discussion of other prerequisites for Category 2
issuers, see supra note 25.
30. In contrast, in proposing the original Regulation S in 1988, the SEC stated that:
The third proposition [behind the Regulation S safe harbors] is that periodic report-
ing under the Exchange Act can be relied upon for the protection of investors once
the marketing effort has been completed. After the foreign distribution has been
completed and the marketing efforts have terminated, routine secondary trading may
begin as a matter of course. The periodic reporting requirements of the Exchange Act
would protect investors in the U.S. market by assuring that information concerning
the issuer would be available.
Proposed Offshore Offers & Sales, supra note 2, at 22,665.
31. The SEC, moreover, has made clear that debt securities convertible into equity are
considered the same as equity securities. See Offshore Offers & Sales, supra note 10, at 9634
(citing Rule 405 of Regulation C under the Securities Act that “defines the term ‘equity secu-
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U.S. issuers and their distributors seeking to take advantage of
Category 2 transactions through an issue of debt securities are subject
to a “distribution compliance period” of forty days.32 Prior to the ex-
piration of the distribution compliance period, issuers and distributors
must ensure that “no offers or sales are made to a U.S. person or for
the account or benefit of a U.S. person (other than a distributor).”33
Issuers and distributors must also implement “offering restrictions”
prior to the expiration of the distribution compliance period. Rule
902(g) of the Securities Act, in turn, defines the offering restrictions
to require, among other things, that distributors in the offering agree,
in writing, that all offers and sales of the securities prior to the expira-
tion of the distribution compliance period are made through a regis-
tered offering, through an exemption from registration, or in accor-
dance with Rules 903 or 904 of the Securities Act.34
The second class of exempt transactions available to U.S. issuers
under Regulation S, termed “Category 3” transactions, is set forth in
Rule 903(b)(3) of the Securities Act.35 Unlike with Category 2 trans-
rity’ to include stock, securities convertible or exchangeable into stock, warrants, options, rights
to purchase stock, and other types of equity-related securities”).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(ii)(A). In the original Regulation S, the distribution compli-
ance period was referred to as the “restricted period.” See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R.
§ 903(c)(2) (1990).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(2)(i).
34. See id. § 230.902(g). Distributors must also agree in writing that for offers and sales of a
domestic issuer’s equity securities, they will not engage in hedging transactions prior to the expi-
ration of the distribution compliance period unless in compliance with the Securities Act. See id.
§ 230.902(g)(1)(ii). In addition, purchasers of a Category 3 Regulation S offering (including all
domestic issuers of equity securities) must agree “not to engage in hedging transactions with
regard to such securities unless in compliance with the [Securities] Act.” Id.
§ 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2); see also Jon B. Jordan, Regulation S and Offshore Capital: Will the
New Amendments Rid the Safe Harbor of Pirates?, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 58, 115 (1998)
(“[The SEC] did not explicitly provide in the regulation what, if any, hedging transactions are
prohibited under Regulation S. There is also no framework for when hedging transactions can
take place in ‘compliance with the Act’ as provided for in the new anti-hedging provisions under
Category Three.”) (citations omitted).
The offering restrictions also require that:
All offering materials and documents (other than press releases) used in connection
with offers and sales of the securities prior to the expiration of the distribution com-
pliance period . . . shall include statements to the effect that the securities have not
been registered under the Act and may not be offered or sold in the United States or
to U.S. persons (other than distributors) unless the securities are registered under the
Act, or an exemption from the registration requirements of the Act is available. For
offers and sales of equity securities of domestic issuers, such offering materials and
documents also must state that hedging transactions involving those securities may
not be conducted unless in compliance with the Act.
17 C.F.R. § 230.902(g)(2).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3).
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actions, all domestic U.S. issuers may qualify under Rule 903(b)(3)
for an exemption from section 5’s registration requirements, regard-
less of whether a company meets the Exchange Act–reporting com-
pany requirements.36 Also, where Category 2 transactions only en-
compass debt securities, Category 3 transactions may include both
debt and equity securities.37
As with Category 2 offerings, issuers and distributors in a Cate-
gory 3 offering must comply with offering restrictions as set forth in
Rule 902(g).38 To limit further the possibility of resales into the
United States, Rule 903(b)(3)(iii) imposes a distribution compliance
period of one year on Category 3 transactions.39 Prior to the expira-
tion of the one-year distribution compliance period for a Category 3
offering, issuers and distributors are also subject to a number of
transactional restrictions. For example, Rule 903(b)(3) includes a re-
quirement that purchasers certify that they are not a U.S. person and
agree to resell the securities only in accordance with Regulation S, in
compliance with section 5’s registration requirements, or through an-
other exemption from registration (the “certification” requirement).40
Issuers are further required to place a legend on issued securities in-
dicating that the securities were sold through Regulation S and are
unregistered (the “legending” requirement).41 Issuers are also re-
quired to refuse to register any transfer of the securities not made
through a registered offering, an exemption from registration, or un-
der the terms of Regulation S (the “stop-transfer” requirement).42
Significantly, domestic Exchange Act–reporting issuers offering
equity securities confronted fewer restrictions prior to the SEC’s 1998
reforms. In comparison to the present one-year distribution compli-
ance period, domestic reporting issuers that sought to sell equity se-
curities abroad faced only a forty-day restricted period before the re-
forms.43 Similarly, domestic reporting issuers offering equity prior to
36. Rule 903(b)(3) states that its exemption provisions apply “to securities that are not eli-
gible for Category 1 or 2.” Id.
37. Issuers seeking to conduct a Category 3 transaction must meet the two basic Regulation
S requirements. See supra note 25.
38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (describing the offering restrictions under
Rule 902(g) of the Securities Act). Regulation S offerings under Category 3 must also comply
with the two basic offshore offering and directed selling efforts requirements. See supra note 25.
39. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii).
40. See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(1),(2).
41. See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(3).
42. See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(4).
43. See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 902(c)(2) (1990).
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the 1998 reforms were not required to meet the same rigid certifica-
tion, legending, and stop-transfer requirements that apply to all do-
mestic issuers under the present Regulation S. By removing any dis-
tinction among Exchange Act–reporting and nonreporting companies
issuing equity, the 1998 reforms increased the transactional cost to
Exchange Act–reporting companies desiring to raise capital abroad.44
Commentators have argued that the legending and stop-transfer re-
quirements of Regulation S make it difficult for U.S. issuers to get
their Regulation S securities listed on a foreign exchange.45 Moreover,
Rule 905, promulgated as part of the 1998 reforms, makes clear that
foreign investors that purchase Regulation S securities, even through
secondary market transactions abroad, receive “restricted securities”
that may be subsequently resold into the United States only through
registration with the SEC or an exemption from registration.46
The need for greater regulation of Exchange Act–reporting issu-
ers, however, is unclear. Exchange Act–reporting issuers already must
periodically disclose to the SEC and the U.S. securities markets a
wide array of information useful to investors.47 Compared with non-
reporting issuers, U.S. investors are at less of an informational disad-
44. The SEC has argued that, for all types of issuers and securities issued, a risk exists that
“an offering could be made at a discount to purchasers offshore who may engage in an illegal
distribution back into the United States.” Offshore Offers & Sales, supra note 10, at 9634. But
see supra note 30 (quoting from the SEC’s earlier position in favor of separate treatment for
Exchange Act–reporting issuers).
45. An example of this type of argument can be found in a memorandum discussing the
sales of convertible securities of U.S. reporting companies under Regulation S:
Issuers and investment banks are concerned that if U.S. reporting companies are re-
quired to issue convertible securities outside the United States in the form of physical
definitive certificates, it would be a serious impediment to the ability of U.S. issuers
and other distribution participants to effect offerings of convertible securities in reli-
ance on Regulation S because non-U.S. investors strongly favor holding securities
through book-entry systems and will not want to bear the costs, administrative bur-
den and added settlement risk of being required to deliver physical securities and cer-
tifications of compliance upon each transfer.
Alan L. Beller, Memorandum from Cravath, Swaine & Moore Regarding Sales of Convertible
Securities of U.S. Reporting Companies Under Regulation S (August 24, 1998) Re: Sales of Con-
vertible Securities of U.S. Reporting Companies Under Regulation S, 1085 PLI/CORP. 177, 180-81
(1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
In response, the SEC simply states, “It is possible that some [foreign] markets can ac-
commodate such securities or may adapt to accommodate them in the future.” Offshore Offers
& Sales, supra note 10, at 9637.
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.905; see also supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (describing
Rule 144’s safe harbor for the resale of restricted securities).
47. See supra note 6 (describing the periodic disclosure requirements placed on Exchange
Act–reporting issuers).
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vantage with an Exchange Act–reporting issuer.48 Furthermore, in
November 1996 the SEC increased the disclosure requirements for
Exchange Act–reporting issuers conducting a Regulation S offering
(the “1996 reporting reform”).49 Prior to the 1996 reporting reform,
the SEC did not specifically require issuers to disclose information on
Regulation S offerings. Post–reporting reform, the SEC requires re-
porting issuers to reveal all equity-related Regulation S offerings
within fifteen days of the offering under Item 9 of Form 8-K.50 Given
the information that Exchange Act–reporting issuers already provide
investors, this Article assesses whether the SEC’s 1998 reforms to
Regulation S address any substantial risk to U.S. investors.51
48. See supra note 30 (quoting the SEC’s original assumption that the securities market has
information available on Exchange Act–reporting issuers). On the other hand, evidence exists
that less than one thousand of the more than ten thousand Exchange Act–reporting companies
have at least one investment analyst actively following the company. See JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 41 (1st ed. 1991) (citing REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N xviii & 40-42
(1977)).
As a result, the market may have good information for only a subset of the larger mar-
ket capitalization Exchange Act–reporting issuers. Rather than focus on Exchange Act–report-
ing issuers, therefore, regulators may wish to define a subset of the well-followed issuers. For
example, the SEC’s “Aircraft Carrier” release proposes applying relaxed registration provisions
for “Form B” issuers. Form B issuers in turn are those companies with at least a $75 million ag-
gregate market capitalization and an average daily trading volume above $1 million, among
other requirements. See The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 33-
7606A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174, at 67,185 (Dec. 4, 1998).
49. The Regulation S equity reporting requirement became effective on November 18,
1996. See Periodic Reporting of Unregistered Equity Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
37801, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,506, at 54,506 (Oct. 18, 1996). According to SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt, after the reforms, “[t]he market will thus have an opportunity to react to such offerings
before the restrictions against resale in the US expire.” Registration of Securities: SEC Tightens
Reg S, Other Rules for Unregistered Equity Securities Sales, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1239 (Oct. 11, 1996).
50. See Form 8-K, Original Item 9, Exchange Act Release No. 4961-Y, 1953 SEC LEXIS
34, at *14 (Nov. 12, 1953); Periodic Reporting of Unregistered Equity Sales, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-37801, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,506, at 54,507 (Oct. 18, 1996). Item 9 of Form 8-K requires
issuers of equity Regulation S securities to report the information mandated under Item 702 of
Regulation S-B, including the offering date, the amount of securities, the total offering price,
and the principal underwriters among other information. See Form 8-K, Original Item 9, Ex-
change Act Release No. 4961-Y, 1953 SEC LEXIS 34, at *14 (Nov. 12, 1953).
After January 1, 1999, however, issuers could delay until their next normally scheduled
periodic disclosure under Form 10-K or 10-Q to disclose information on a Regulation S offering.
A delay of up to one-quarter year, therefore, is now possible before the market learns of a
Regulation S offering. See Offshore Offers & Sales, supra note 10, at 9638.
51. The SEC itself recognizes that smaller “microcap” companies may pose a greater risk
of Regulation S abuse. See Offshore Offers & Sales, supra note 10, at 9632 (“Regulation S has
been used as a means of perpetrating fraudulent and manipulative schemes, especially schemes
involving the securities of thinly capitalized or ‘microcap’ companies.”).
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II.  THE REAL DANGER OF REGULATION S
Regulation S provides issuers with a means to conduct an offer-
ing of securities outside the U.S. regulatory regime while still enjoying
the possibility that the securities may eventually trade within the U.S.
capital markets.52 For example, after a one-year holding period pursu-
ant to Rule 144, most foreign investors are able to resell their unregis-
tered securities freely into the United States.53 To the extent that the
only liquid secondary market for most domestic issuers is located
within the United States, foreign investors seeking to resell will do so
into the United States.
With resales of unregistered securities into the United States
come several purported harms that may afflict U.S. investors—harms
that the SEC and others have argued support the present limited
scope of the Regulation S exemption and perhaps justify further re-
ducing the ability of U.S. issuers to conduct offerings outside the U.S.
regulatory regime.54 In particular, commentators have focused on the
large discount at which Regulation S offerings are typically sold rela-
tive to the U.S. secondary market price. Foreign investors who are
able to engage in resales rapidly back into the United States, the ar-
gument goes, may capture the benefit of this large discount at the ex-
pense of U.S. investors.55 This part analyzes the composition of the
Regulation S offering discount and makes the argument that neither a
large discount nor resales into the United States of unregistered secu-
rities necessarily translates into additional undiversifiable risks for
U.S. investors.
Whether U.S. investors are in fact harmed is contingent upon
three key factors: (1) the informational advantage that managers of
the issuer enjoy over the U.S. secondary market; (2) the ability of the
52. The Regulation S loophole is limited to the extent that issuers of Regulation S securi-
ties must still satisfy other aspects of the U.S. securities regime. For example, to the extent that
the issuer is listed on a national securities exchange or satisfies minimum net asset and number
of shareholder requirements, the issuer is obligated to comply with various periodic information
filing requirements with the SEC. See supra note 6 (detailing the Exchange Act–reporting re-
quirements).
53. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1999); see also supra note 13 (describing additional condi-
tions required to meet the Rule 144 safe harbor).
54. See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 8, passim (describing the harms U.S. in-
vestors face from Regulation S).
55. See id. at 35,664; see also Futterman, supra note 8, at 849-51 (providing an example of
foreign investors using short sales to quickly shift the economic risk of ownership into the
United States for securities initially purchased at a large discount).
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U.S. secondary market to adjust to the news of a Regulation S offer-
ing with accuracy and in a timely manner; and (3) the incentive of
managers to engage in opportunistic behavior. This part discusses the
importance of these factors in the range of possible situations in
which an offshore offering may occur.
To facilitate the discussion, this Article employs the following
hypothetical. Consider Texon, Inc., an oil refinery company located in
Texas. Texon is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange
and has a pre-offering secondary market price of $100 per share. All
pre-offering shareholders of Texon are located inside the United
States. There are one million shares of Texon outstanding, giving
Texon a market capitalization of $100 million. Managers, neverthe-
less, have nonpublic information that leads them to believe that
Texon should be valued at $70 per share. For purposes of the hypo-
thetical, call $70 per share the “fundamental value” of Texon, giving
Texon a total fundamental value of $70 million. Relative to the fun-
damental value, therefore, the secondary market overvalues Texon’s
common stock. Texon is planning a Regulation S offering to foreign
investors of an additional one million shares. For simplicity, assume
that the issuer plans to keep the offering proceeds in an interest-
bearing bank account indefinitely.56 Given this assumption, the total
fundamental value of Texon will increase by exactly the amount of
the offering proceeds.57
This Article explores two possible situations: (a) where managers
act in the best interests of their pre-offering shareholders and (b)
where managers act opportunistically, using Regulation S to engage
in self-dealing or to raise suboptimal levels of capital.
A. Managers Acting in the Best Interests of Pre-Offering
Shareholders
Managers often will act in the best interests of their company and
the company’s shareholders. The incentives of managers and their
shareholders are aligned through a combination of ethical considera-
56. More technically, assume that the interest rate just equals the discount rate for the time
value of money. The assumption that the issuer simply plans to put the offering proceeds into a
bank account will later be relaxed. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
57. The analysis assumes for simplicity that offering expenses equal zero. The per share
fundamental value, in turn, will depend on both the increase in the total fundamental value of
Texon and the increase in the number of outstanding common shares.
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tions,58 reputational concerns,59 state law fiduciary duties,60 stock op-
tions,61 and market forces.62 Managers with such incentives will seek to
maximize the value to pre-offering shareholders from the issuance of
new securities, seeking systematically to sell into markets that over-
value the securities.63 Even where managers act in the best interests of
pre-offering shareholders and these shareholders are all U.S. resi-
dents, a Regulation S offering may still impact negatively on certain
segments of U.S. investors. In particular, where issuers seek to sell
overvalued securities into the U.S. markets indirectly through a
Regulation S offering, U.S. purchasers of the securities may suffer
harm.64 Crucial to the harm which U.S. investors face is the amount of
overvaluation in the U.S. secondary market and the market’s ability
to react to news of a Regulation S offering to correct for this over-
valuation.
This section examines the possible harm to U.S. investors from
overvaluation-driven Regulation S offerings through four scenarios:
58. Many business schools, for example, require students to enroll in business ethics
courses. See Richard Donkin, Business Ethics: The Rights and Wrongs, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997,
at 4.
59. Managers, for example, may seek to develop a pro-shareholder reputation to aid them
in obtaining a better job or a promotion. See Shuichi Senbongi & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.,
Managerial Reputation and the Competitiveness of an Industry, 13 INT’L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 95,
108-09 (1995) (predicting that managers produce more quantity than would maximize profits in
imperfectly competitive industries as a means of increasing their reputation in the managerial
labor market).
60. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1991) (“A director shall dis-
charge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee . . . in a manner
he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”); see also Robert Cooter &
Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Conse-
quences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1991) (providing a law-and-economics analysis of the
fiduciary duties).
61. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1989, at 65 (citing a wave of organizational innovation toward “active investors”); Michael C.
Jensen & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market,
7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 4-6 (1985) (discussing the effect of aligning shareholders’ and managers’
interests).
62. For example, the takeover market may align the incentives of managers with share-
holders. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 YALE L.J. 698, 705 (1982) (“Corporate control transactions can reduce agency costs if better
managers obtain control of the firm’s assets or if they alter the incentive structure facing existing
managers. Corporate takeovers, and subsequent changes in management, increase the wealth of
investors.”).
63. See Myers & Majluf, supra note 17, passim.
64. Even when purchasing overvalued securities, U.S. purchasers are not necessarily
harmed. Where all the pre-offering shareholders of the issuer purchase overvalued Regulation S
securities in the same proportion as their pre-offering ownership, the shareholders simply trans-
fer value to themselves. In such a situation, the pre-offering shareholders may still suffer a re-
duction in value from the transaction costs of the offering, however.
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(1) where resales of Regulation S securities do not take place into the
United States; (2) where resales occur and the market fails to react to
news of the Regulation S offering; (3) where resales occur and the
market reacts perfectly to news of the Regulation S offering; and (4)
where resales occur and the market reacts imperfectly to such news.
1. No Resales into the United States. Consider first the situation
where securities sold abroad are never resold into the United States.
Texon common stock, for instance, after being sold through
Regulation S, may come to rest in Asia and never physically return to
the United States. Managers of Texon who expect no resales into the
United States must first decide upon a price at which to offer their
securities. In particular, managers that seek to maximize the value for
pre-offering shareholders will have an incentive to issue Texon’s
common stock at a price above the company’s fundamental value.65
For example, where Texon is able to sell one million shares in its
Regulation S offering at $100 per share to foreign investors, equal to
the pre-offering U.S. secondary market price, the company will take
in $100 million of additional capital. Texon will then have a post-
offering total fundamental value of $170 million,66 giving Texon
shareholders a per share fundamental value of $85.67
In this situation, U.S. investors as a group are directly benefited
from the Regulation S offering. Where the pre-offering shareholders
of Texon (all U.S. investors) used to hold securities with a fundamen-
tal value of $70, they now own securities with a value of $85 per share.
In contrast, foreign investors that purchased Texon securities at over-
inflated prices from Texon are systematically harmed, overpaying $15
per share on average for their investment.68
Despite the direct benefit, U.S. investors may claim several pos-
sible harms. First, once the U.S. market learns of the offering, the
market price of Texon’s stock inside the United States will drop in re-
65. See Myers & Majluf, supra note 17, at 207.
66. Pre-offering, Texon had a fundamental value of $70 million, despite its U.S. secondary
market price of $100 million.
67. Post-offering, two million common shares of Texon will be outstanding. Given a post-
offering total fundamental value of $170 million, the per share value will equal $85.
68. The observation that U.S. investors and, in particular, pre-offering shareholders of the
issuer are benefited when the issuer sells overvalued securities to foreign investors leads to the
conclusion that U.S. investors gain as U.S. companies actively defraud foreign investors. Indi-
rectly, nevertheless, U.S. investors may face harm from such activity. In addition to the harms
discussed in the text, U.S. investors may face harm to the extent that other countries retaliate
through lax regulations that allow foreign companies to export fraud into the United States.
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sponse. Given the incentive of managers to sell securities when the
market overvalues the securities,69 investors will take news of an of-
fering as a signal that managers believe the market is overvalued.70
Such a signal, in turn, will result in a drop in the secondary market
price. Where the stock market suffers from no systematic biases, the
market reaction on average will correctly value the degree of over-
valuation, and the market price will tend toward $85 per share.71
U.S. shareholders in Texon may then argue that they suffer harm
from the drop in the U.S. secondary market price resulting from dis-
closure of the offering. Nevertheless, the harm that U.S. investors
bear is no different from the harm resulting from any other disclosure
of negative information about the company.72 Any release of negative
information will result in a stock price decline that reduces the wealth
of pre-disclosure shareholders in the company. To argue against al-
lowing offshore offerings to protect solely against disclosure-related
harms to investors is equivalent to arguing for a delay in providing the
market with valuable information. Although negative disclosures may
harm those U.S. investors that own a particular security, such disclo-
sures equally benefit other U.S. investors seeking to purchase the se-
curity. Thus, to the extent that foreign investors do not resell into the
United States, U.S. investors as a group are not harmed. Finally, dis-
closure of information on the company results in stock market prices
that reflect the true assessment of the relative values of different in-
vestments in society.73
69. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
70. News of an offering, of course, may signal other information to investors. On average,
however, the market will correctly adjust the market price for the possibility that managers
believe the market is overvalued. See Nord Pacific Ltd., Form 8-K (Dec. 24, 1997), available at
http://www.freeedgar.com (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
71. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate
Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2535–39 & nn.75–78 (1997) (summarizing evidence of unbiased
pricing in the securities markets).
72. Significantly, harm from the informational signal investors receive from the fact of
Regulation S offering itself impacts all shares of the same class of the issuer’s common stock
equally, whether the share is traceable to the Regulation S offering itself or to a prior U.S.-
targeted offering of the issuer. Consider two shares of common stock of Texon, Inc. One share
was sold through Texon’s IPO in the United States in 1980. The other share was sold through a
Regulation S offering to a foreign investor in 1998. Whether a U.S. investor purchases the com-
mon stock carrying an IPO or Regulation S pedigree, shares of the same class of common stock
will provide the same dividend, voting, and liquidation rights, among others. Therefore, nega-
tive information that reduces the market’s assessment of Texon will diminish the value of all
shares of common stock equally regardless of how the shares initially entered the market.
73. As a result, among companies competing with one another to raise additional invest-
ment, capital resources will shift to their highest value use in society. See, e.g., John F. Barry, III,
The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1315-17 (1981)
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Second, U.S. investors may be harmed to the extent that inves-
tors in the rest of the world start viewing the group of all U.S. compa-
nies as systematically issuing overvalued securities. Foreign investors
with such an expectation will refuse to purchase U.S. securities unless
granted a large discount. Thus, the scenario’s assumption that foreign
investors would pay $100 per share for Texon’s securities is unrealis-
tic; rational foreign investors will discount for the risk of purchasing
overvalued securities and pay, on average, only the pre-offering fun-
damental value of $70.74 Moreover, to the extent that foreign investors
are unable to distinguish between different issuers, they will demand
a similar discount of all U.S. issuers, raising the cost of capital for
even those U.S. companies without an overvaluation motive in seek-
ing to raise funds overseas.75
Significantly, Regulation S affords U.S. companies no protection
against the discount that foreign investors may demand of issuers to
compensate for the risk of purchasing overvalued securities.76 Indi-
vidual U.S. companies nevertheless may attempt to signal the value of
their securities through a variety of mechanisms. For instance, a U.S.
company could voluntarily register its offering under U.S. securities
laws. In the alternative, U.S. issuers could register under another
country’s regime to signal the value of their securities to foreign in-
vestors.77 To the extent that an individual U.S. company internalizes
(discussing the “continual redirection of capital from less promising to more promising pur-
suits”). Professor Lynn Stout, in contrast, argues that many companies do not turn to the equity
capital markets to raise money and that alternative sources—including bank financing—do not
rely on equity market price signals. Stout also contends that the price issuers receive is more a
function of the negotiations between the issuers and their underwriters than the contemporary
secondary market price. See Lynn Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 642-57
(1988).
74. Note that as a percentage of the pre-offering price, foreign investors are receiving a
large discount. However, foreign investors that do not resell into the United States ahead of the
market reaction do not benefit from this discount.
75. A lemons problem may then result as companies with non-overvalued securities choose
not to issue securities rather than endure a discount from investors that are unable to distinguish
among different companies. The average level of overvaluation in offered securities will then
rise, resulting in an even greater required discount for investors and driving even more non-
overvalued companies out of the securities offering market. See George A. Akerloff, The Mar-
ket for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488-500 (1970)
(describing the lemons problem).
76. Indeed, the premise of Regulation S is to free U.S. issuers from the registration re-
quirements of the Securities Act so long as the issuers offer and sell securities only outside the
United States. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing the territorial nature of
Regulation S).
77. U.S. companies could also employ a financial intermediary with a good reputation to
certify the value of the companies’ securities. See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeep-
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the full benefit from distinguishing itself in this manner in the form of
a higher offering price, it will have full incentives to do so.78
2. Resales into the United States Pre–Market Reaction. The
second possible situation involves the resale of Regulation S
securities initially sold to foreign investors back into the United
States. In particular, consider the scenario where foreign investors are
able to resell securities into the United States prior to any secondary
market reaction to the news of the Regulation S offering. As a result,
foreign investors will, on average, receive the pre-offering market
price for their securities from U.S. purchasers.79
As with the previous situation of no resales into the United
States, managers seeking to maximize the value of pre-offering share-
holders will conduct a Regulation S offering only when they receive
an offering price at least equal to the company’s fundamental value.
Selling at below the fundamental value results in the dilution of all
pre-offering shareholders, including the management’s own holdings.
Managers, therefore, will attempt to obtain as great an overvalued
price as possible from the offering. The greater the price managers
are able to obtain from the foreign investors, the more wealth manag-
ers are able to transfer to the issuer’s pre-offering shareholders.
In the Texon example, foreign investors will expect to resell into
the United States at $100 per share, the pre-offering market price.
Absent any motivation on the part of managers to benefit foreign in-
vestors, managers of Texon will negotiate with foreign investors for a
price as close to $100 as possible. Put another way, given Texon’s
fundamental value of $70 per share, the amount of overvaluation in
the U.S. secondary market is equal to $30 per share (the “overvalua-
ers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 927-33 (1998); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of
a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 89-91 (1986).
78. For example, consider a market where foreign investors expect that all U.S. issuers on
average overstate the value of their securities by 50% and where the investors are unable to dis-
tinguish among issuers. In such a market, investors will demand a 50% discount, even from issu-
ers that do not engage in any overstatement of value. To the extent that such truthful issuers are
able, however, to signal credibly their value, they are able to sell their securities without any dis-
count. Some commentators, nevertheless, have argued that issuers may ignore the benefit accu-
rate securities pricing may have for external third parties. Professor Merritt Fox, for example,
has argued that labor benefits from accurate securities prices. See Fox, supra note 71, at 2562-69.
79. The exact price foreign investors receive will depend on other exogenous effects on the
market that occur prior to resales. To the extent that no systematic bias exists on these exoge-
nous effects, foreign investors on average will receive the pre-offering market price plus a risk-
adjusted return for the amount of time between the offering and the commencement of the re-
sales.
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tion surplus”).80 Managers will want to capture as much of the $30
overvaluation surplus as possible through a low offering discount for
foreign investors.
The magnitude of the offering discount, therefore, depends on
the relative bargaining strengths of the issuer and foreign investors.
Where foreign investors enjoy a stronger bargaining position, the is-
suer will offer the securities at a greater discount. Consider the situa-
tion where Texon conducts its offering at $75 per share to foreign in-
vestors who then immediately resell into the U.S. at $100 per share.
Texon receives only $5 per share of the overvaluation surplus. On the
other hand, where the issuer is in a more favorable bargaining posi-
tion, the issuer will sell to foreign investors at a reduced discount. For
instance, Texon may sell securities at $95 per share to foreign inves-
tors that resell into the U.S. at $100 per share. Texon then receives
$25 per share of the overvaluation surplus and foreign investors re-
ceive $5 per share of the surplus. In either case, however, U.S. pur-
chasers of Texon securities resold through Regulation S overpay by
$30 per share.81 Regardless of whether the issuer or foreign investors
enjoy stronger bargaining positions, U.S. purchasers are harmed
through the indirect sales of overvalued securities into the United
States.
The key determinants of the harm that U.S. investors face from a
Regulation S offering involving resales into the United States are the
informational advantage managers have over the U.S. secondary
market and the ability of the U.S. secondary market to react to news
of the Regulation S offering. First, the degree of informational advan-
tage that managers of the issuer enjoy over the secondary market di-
rectly affects the size of the overvaluation surplus. Where managers
possess confidential nonpublic information, there is a heightened
probability that the market’s estimation of the company’s value, rep-
resented through the secondary market price, is different from the
fundamental value. The magnitude of the difference is likely to be
greater as well. Of course, the market may also mistakenly under-
80. In this situation, the overvaluation surplus is equal to the $100 secondary market price
minus the $70 fundamental value.
81. In fact, all purchasers of Texon’s securities overpay by the amount of the overvaluation
surplus whether they purchase securities originally sold through Regulation S or from an earlier
U.S.-based offering. U.S. investors, as a group, however, are harmed only to the extent that
some of the overvaluation surplus is transferred not to another U.S. investor but rather outside
the United States. The magnitude of the harm to U.S. investors as a group, therefore, depends
on the number of Regulation S securities resold into the United States.
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value the company’s securities to a greater degree when managers
enjoy a larger informational advantage.82 However, managers may
choose systematically to forego issuing securities in such situations,
selling only when the market overvalues the securities.83 As a result,
the frequency and magnitude of overvalued offerings will increase
with the extent of the informational advantage managers have over
the market.
Second, the ability of the U.S. markets to react both quickly and
accurately to news of a Regulation S offering will affect the amount of
harm U.S. investors face from the resale of overvalued Regulation S
securities into the United States. U.S. investors face the greatest risk
of purchasing overvalued securities resold through Regulation S
where the market reacts only slowly and inaccurately to news of a
Regulation S offering. In the extreme, where the market fails to react
to the Regulation S offering prior to resales into the United States,
foreign investors and the issuer may obtain the full value of the over-
valuation surplus as part of the offering proceeds to the detriment of
U.S. purchasers.
Short sales, in particular, may expose U.S. investors to the risk of
resales of overvalued securities into the United States. A foreign in-
vestor, for example, may purchase securities from Texon at $90 per
share (leaving the pre-offering shareholders of Texon with a gain of
$20 per share above the pre-offering fundamental value of $70 per
share). The foreign investor may then execute short sales of securities
within the United States, borrowing securities in Texon from a U.S.
broker and then selling the borrowed securities at $100 per share into
the United States. After the expiration of the Regulation S restricted
period, the foreign investor may then use its offshore securities in
Texon to “cover” the investor’s initial loan of securities from the U.S.
broker. Through short sales, a foreign investor may immediately lock-
in the $10 per share discount it received from the issuer, and the is-
suer indirectly may capture value from the secondary market’s over-
valuation of the issuer’s securities for the pre-offering shareholders.
82. For example, the U.S. secondary market price for Texon may equal $50 per share.
Where Texon has a fundamental value of $70 per share, issuing securities at $50 will dilute the
interest of pre-offering shareholders to the benefit of purchasing investors.
83. See Robert A. Korajczyk et al., The Effect of Information Releases on the Pricing and
Timing of Equity Issues, 4 REV. FIN. STUD. 685, 688-92 (1992) (discussing the incentive of man-
agers to delay an equity offering prior to the disclosure of positive information but not prior to
the disclosure of negative information).
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Short sales, therefore, may provide foreign investors an easy
means of reselling overvalued securities into the United States prior
to any secondary market reaction to news of the offering, potentially
reducing the effective Regulation S restricted period down to zero
calendar time. The SEC, nevertheless, started taking a hard line
against foreign investors engaging in short sales of Regulation S secu-
rities in 1995.84 The 1998 reforms further clarified the SEC’s prohibi-
tion against short sales and other hedging transactions that have the
effect of shifting the economic risk of ownership into the United
States prior to the expiration of any limitations on resales into the
United States.85
3. Resales into the United States Post–Market Reaction—
Accurate Response. The third situation involves a Regulation S
offering where foreign investors engage in resales back into the
United States after the U.S. secondary market reacts to news of the
offering. Assume further that the U.S. secondary market reaction is
perfectly accurate, discounting fully for the negative information
signaled through news of the offering.
U.S. markets may receive news on a Regulation S offering in one
of several ways. First, the issuer may directly notify the market of the
offering. Issuers, for instance, may voluntarily distribute a press re-
lease on the offering.86 In cases where the offering signals positive in-
84. See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 8, at 35,663:
Since the adoption of Regulation S, it has come to the Commission’s attention that
some market participants are conducting placements of securities purportedly off-
shore under Regulation S under circumstances that indicate that such securities are in
essence being placed offshore temporarily to evade registration requirements with the
result that the incidence of ownership of the securities never leaves the U.S. market,
or that a substantial portion of the economic risk relating thereto is left in or is re-
turned to the U.S. market during the restricted period, or that the transaction is such
that there was no reasonable expectation that the securities could be viewed as actu-
ally coming to rest abroad. These transactions are the types of activities that run afoul
of Preliminary Note 2, would not be covered by the safe harbors and would be found
not to be an offer and sale outside the United States for purposes of the general
statement under Rule 901.
See also In re GFL Ultra Fund Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 7423, [1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,949, at 89,752 (June 18, 1997) (holding that a fund that purchased
securities through a Regulation S offering and then immediately engaged in short sales into the
United States acted as a statutory underwriter under section 2(11) of the Securities Act for the
issuer).
85. See supra note 34 (discussing the 1998 reform provisions against hedging transactions).
86. Numerous companies issued a press release related to their Regulation S offering dur-
ing the pre–reporting reform period. See, e.g., Intl Thoroughbred Completes Sale of 1.9M Shrs
For $5.7M, DOW JONES NEWS SERV., Dec. 29, 1995; Preferred Telecom Completes $1.5 Million
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formation about the company, managers and pre-offering sharehold-
ers gain from such disclosures. For example, an issuer may engage in
a Regulation S offering to raise capital for a shareholder wealth-
increasing product development project; investors may consider news
of the offering as a credible signal to the market that the product de-
velopment is moving forward.87
Second, the market may learn of a Regulation S offering indi-
rectly through changes in trading volume in the market itself. In the
case of issuers followed by several analysts, for example, an increase
in trading volume will receive immediate attention. Analysts may
then investigate further to determine the source of the increased vol-
ume. U.S.-based analysts, for instance, may monitor the level of short
sales in a particular issuer’s securities. An increase in short sales may
spur the analysts to investigate further the source of the short sales,
potentially uncovering the identity of foreign investors and the exis-
tence of a Regulation S offering as a result. Foreign investors that
hope to take advantage of a slowly reacting market, therefore, must
sell securities piecemeal into the market. Where several foreign inves-
tors own securities, however, they will face a collective action prob-
lem in restraining themselves from flooding the U.S. market with
their securities. Similarly, financial institutions with multinational of-
fices may learn of a Regulation S offering from resales that occur
abroad and convey this information to affiliated analysts monitoring
the issuer inside the United States.88 On the other hand, not all com-
panies enjoy an active analyst following.89 The absence of analysts
Regulation S, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 30, 1995; SUGEN Raises Approximately $16.8 Million in a
Regulation S Transaction, BUS. WIRE, Sept. 21, 1995.
87. Of course, only some product development projects benefit shareholders. In other
cases, managers may engage in product development projects to increase their power and pres-
tige. See infra note 107 (discussing the general agency problem between managers and share-
holders).
88. Many financial market intermediaries are now present in a large number of countries.
For example, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. has 41 offices in 23 countries worldwide. See
Goldman Sachs: About Us—Office Locations, Goldman Sachs, at http://www.gs.com/about/
office-locations.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
Information that brokers in a Goldman Sachs office located in Paris learn of U.S. securities
issued or traded abroad, therefore, may make its way easily into the U.S. markets through the
Goldman Sachs office in New York.
89. Note that evidence exists that less than one thousand of the more than ten thousand
Exchange Act–reporting companies have at least one investment analyst actively following the
company. See COX ET AL., supra note 48, at 41 (citing REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N xviii & 40-42 (1977)).
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may make it more difficult for the market to respond accurately to
the increased trading volume from resales into the United States.90
Once the market does receive news of a Regulation S offering,
the impact on secondary market prices depends on a number of dif-
ferent factors. The mere fact, for instance, that a company’s managers
seek to raise capital from the market may suggest that the managers
believe that the market presently overvalues the company.91 Manag-
ers who seek to maximize the present shareholders’ wealth, including
perhaps their own wealth, will attempt to sell securities into the mar-
ket at an inflated value. Several other motivations, of course, exist for
a Regulation S offering. For example, news that a company seeks
specifically to raise capital abroad through Regulation S rather than
inside the United States may signal that the company intends to ex-
pand into overseas business opportunities.92 The possibility of other
motivations, therefore, may result in a noisy signal sent to the market.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the market suffers from no systematic
biases in how it interprets information, on average the market will
correctly determine the degree of overvaluation.93
Where the market’s response to the Regulation S offering is
100% accurate, neither the issuer nor foreign investors are able to
capture any overvaluation surplus from U.S. purchasers. Rational
90. See also infra Part IV.B (discussing the need to distinguish among different types of
issuers in Regulation S). Nevertheless, where few analysts follow a particular company, the
market typically is thinly traded. For example, companies that trade on the U.S. over-the-
counter pink sheets market have few active analysts tracking their securities and a relatively low
daily trading volume. See, e.g., 3D HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES
AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 23.10 (2d ed. 2000) (providing a description of the pink
sheets market). A large influx of securities, therefore, may create a larger percentage increase in
the trading volume, prompting even casual market participants to investigate further to deter-
mine the cause of the volume increase.
91. Evidence exists that the market reacts negatively to announcements of an equity issue.
See Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, 15 J. FIN. ECON.
61, 61 (1986) (investigating the effects on stock prices of seasoned equity offerings); Ronald W.
Masulis & Ashok N. Korwar, Seasoned Equity Offerings: An Empirical Investigation, 15 J. FIN.
ECON. 91, 91 (1986) (examining common stock price adjustments to announcements of under-
written common stock offerings); Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, Valuation Effects
of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 31, 31 (1986) (pondering the
stock price effects of security offerings on the inferences made by investors).
92. Companies seeking to enter into a new geographical market, for example, may desire
to establish shareholder ties with key individuals in those countries. For instance, Nord Pacific
Resources Limited sold 600,000 of its common stock to Mineral Resources Development
Company Pty, Limited, a corporation wholly owned by the Papua New Guinea government, in
late 1997. Nord Pacific planned to use the proceeds of its offering to commence nickel and gold
mining projects in Papua New Guinea. See Nord Pacific Ltd. Form 8-K, supra note 70.
93. The noise in the information signal sent from news of a Regulation S offering increases
the variance in the market’s overall reaction.
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foreign investors will therefore require a discount from the pre-
offering secondary market price to compensate for the expected nega-
tive secondary market reaction to the offering. Consider the Texon
example. After information on the Regulation S offering enters the
U.S. market, the secondary market price will drop to $70 per share,
the fundamental value of Texon. Foreign investors that resell into the
United States will receive no more than $70 per share for their
Regulation S securities. As a result, if foreign investors pay a price
greater than $70, they transfer value to the pre-offering shareholders
of Texon. Rational foreign investors that anticipate the drop in the
secondary market price due to the information disclosure of the
Regulation S offering will negotiate for a discount to compensate for
the drop.94 Foreign investors may learn about the fundamental value
from the issuer’s managers as part of their purchase negotiations.
Even where foreign investors do not receive any nonpublic informa-
tion during the offering, they will demand a discount for the average
level of overvaluation among offered Regulation S securities.
Where the U.S. secondary market reacts perfectly to news of a
Regulation S offering prior to the commencement of Regulation S re-
sales, the wealth effect on U.S. investors is similar to the situation in
which Regulation S securities are never resold into the United States.
To the extent that managers engage in offerings of overvalued securi-
ties to foreign investors, pre-offering U.S. shareholders of the issuer
benefit at the expense of foreign investors. Rational foreign investors,
therefore, will demand a discount from the pre-offering U.S. secon-
dary market price equal to the entire overvaluation surplus. Dis-
counts for Regulation S offerings where foreign investors expect to
resell only after a U.S. secondary market reaction to news of the of-
fering, all other things being equal, will be greater than the discount
foreign investors receive when reselling into a market that does not
adjust for news of the offering. The mere fact of a large offering dis-
count, however, itself does not result in harm to U.S. investors.95
Compared with the situation where no resales take place into the
United States, resales present an additional risk of harm to U.S. in-
vestors. To the extent that worldwide securities markets are frag-
mented, resales into the United States may result in an increase in the
94. Foreign investors that fail to receive compensation and thus expect to receive a nega-
tive return from the Regulation S investment will simply choose not to invest.
95. Rather, the harm to U.S. investors comes from the disclosure of negative information
that the company’s secondary market price is greater than the fundamental per share value. See
supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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average trading volume in U.S. markets. With an increase in the sup-
ply of securities, some may argue, greater downward pressure may
exist on the U.S. secondary market price regardless of any informa-
tion effect from the offering.96 Thus, despite Texon’s fundamental
value of $70, the addition of one million shares offered through
Regulation S into the U.S. secondary market may cause the market
price to drop below $70 down to $60 per share. Against this possibil-
ity, however, is the force of market arbitrage.97 To the extent that the
market price is below $70, large market participants will have a strong
incentive to purchase additional securities to receive a gain from the
market’s undervaluation of Texon’s common stock.98 The possibility
of arbitrage, moreover, is tied directly with the size of the market for
the issuer’s securities. Since analyzing and tracking a company’s secu-
rities require a fixed expense on the part of financial institutions, the
per-share cost of actively monitoring a company’s securities is much
lower for larger market capitalization issuers.99
4. Resales into the United States Post–Market Reaction—
Inaccurate Response. The fourth situation involves foreign resales of
Regulation S securities after the disclosure of information on the
offering into the U.S. markets with one important difference from the
third situation delineated above: instead of assuming that markets
react with perfect accuracy, the Article now assumes that markets
96. See, e.g., Bruce McWilliams, Money-Go-Round: Higher Still and Higher for the High-
Tech Stocks, DAILY TEL. (London), Feb. 5, 2000, at 16 (“[W]ave[s] of new European technol-
ogy companies that aim to market their shares through initial public offers. . . . will increase the
supply of technology shares and may keep prices from rising. Indeed, if demand is constant and
supply increases, then prices must fall.”).
97. Put another way, the demand for securities is perfectly elastic. See RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 345-46 (5th ed. 1996).
But see Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under
Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 484-92 (1997) (arguing
that the assumptions behind a perfectly elastic demand curve for stocks are flawed).
98. For example, a financial intermediary that purchases 100,000 shares at $60 stands to
gain $1 million once the stock price returns to the fundamental value of $70 per share.
99. On the other hand, some commentators have argued that even financial analysts may
not act entirely rationally. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some
Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers,
84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 643-49 (1996) (arguing that investment professionals may suffer from be-
havioral irrationalities in their investment decisions). Even where money managers act ration-
ally, they may fail to take advantage of all arbitrage opportunities in the securities market to the
extent that their pay and prestige is determined in reference to other money managers, giving
them an incentive to herd together in their decisions. See generally David S. Scharfstein & Jer-
emy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465 (1990) (noting that man-
agers rationally herd their behavior to improve the reputation of their decisionmaking).
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react with some degree of inaccuracy. In particular, assume that the
U.S. secondary market has no systematic biases and is therefore
correct on average.100 Faced with a number of Regulation S offerings,
the market will react on average sufficiently to bring the secondary
market price to the issuer’s fundamental value. For any given issuer,
nevertheless, the market may not adjust to match the post-offering
fundamental value. For instance, in the case of Texon’s Regulation S
offering, foreign investors may expect the market to react to news of
the offering with a price of $70, the fundamental value of Texon
shares. In any specific case, however, the market may react with a
post-disclosure secondary market price of $50 per share, undervaluing
the company. In the alternative, the market may react with a price of
$90, overvaluing the company.
Given some inaccuracy in how the U.S. secondary market inter-
prets information on a Regulation S offering, whether U.S. purchas-
ers are actually harmed from resales into the United States depends
on the informational advantage that foreign investors enjoy over the
U.S. secondary market and on the liquidity needs of the foreign inves-
tors. Consider the situation where Sophie, a foreign investor based in
Belgium, purchases Regulation S securities and then resells into the
United States. Where Sophie has no informational advantage over
U.S. investors, she will not realize that the market overvalues Texon’s
shares when it prices the shares at $90; similarly, she will not realize
that $50 per share undervalues Texon’s shares. Sophie will sell into
U.S. markets at both prices—and U.S. investors are thus equally
likely to overpay or to underpay for the offshore securities resold into
the United States. U.S. investors as a group therefore are not harmed.
Individual U.S. investors purchasing a diversified portfolio of Regula-
tion S securities will experience the same return on average as if they
purchased each individual security at its true fundamental value.101
Consider next the situation where Sophie does enjoy an informa-
tional advantage over the U.S. secondary market through confidential
information obtained from the issuer. Sophie, in deciding whether to
100. Absent some irrationality among investors, see supra note 99, investors will make their
best guess at the value of a security based on the information provided. Although investors may
guess too high or too low, no reason exists to suspect that rational investor will systematically
either be too high or too low.
101. For example, suppose that Andrew, a U.S. investor, pays $10 per share too much for
one issuer’s Regulation S securities and $10 too little for another issuer’s Regulation S securi-
ties. Assuming Andrew buys the same quantity of both issuers’ securities, he will end up with
the same return as if he paid the fundamental value for each set of securities.
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invest in Texon, may ask the issuer for nonpublic information related
to the valuation of Texon.102 Texon is not obligated to furnish such in-
formation to Sophie—at least under U.S. law pursuant to Regulation
S103—but if Texon refuses to supply information voluntarily, Sophie
may choose not to invest.104 Assume Sophie learns that the fundamen-
tal value of Texon is $70 per share. Where the U.S. market overreacts
to news of the Regulation S offering, setting a new market price of
$50 per share, for example, Sophie may choose not to resell. In com-
parison, where the U.S. market underreacts, setting a market price of
$90 per share, Sophie will choose to resell at a profit. On average,
therefore, Sophie and other foreign investors benefit at the expense
of U.S. purchasers.
The degree to which foreign investors gain depends on the in-
formational advantage foreign investors possess over the U.S. secon-
dary market. Absent any systematic biases within the market, the
market will on average be correct in its valuation. Nevertheless, for-
eign investors with an informational advantage will have some ability
to distinguish when the market over- and undervalues the securities.
The larger the informational advantage, the more likely that foreign
investors will realize that the market price incorrectly values the is-
suer. Companies, therefore, with a greater degree of information dis-
closed to the market—including, for instance, Exchange Act–report-
ing companies—provide foreign investors with a diminished
opportunity to transfer value systematically from U.S. investors due
to inaccuracies in U.S. market pricing.105
102. The SEC recently reduced the ability of Exchange Act-reporting issuers to provide
nonpublic material information to potential Regulation S investors, among other parties.  See
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, 2000 WL
1239722 (Aug. 15, 2000).
103. On the other hand, another country’s securities regulatory regime may require such
disclosure. If Texon, Inc. sell securities into Japan under Regulation S, Japanese securities laws
may require additional information disclosure to Japanese investors.
104. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protec-
tion of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 676-78, 682-83 (1984) (discussing the incentive of compa-
nies to voluntarily disclose information to investors). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure
and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 751-52 (1984)
(arguing for a mandatory disclosure regime).
105. As discussed earlier, not all Exchange Act–reporting companies are alike. See supra
note 48. Although Exchange Act–reporting companies must all disclose the same level of infor-
mation periodically under the Exchange Act, see supra note 6, the number of analysts actively
following a company varies widely among the entire group of Exchange Act–reporting compa-
nies. Nevertheless, for some subset of Exchange Act–reporting companies, the claim remains
true that foreign investors will have a much reduced ability to transfer value away from U.S.
investors.
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The ability of foreign investors to gain at the expense of an inac-
curate market reaction also depends on the liquidity needs of the for-
eign investors. Where foreign investors require immediate cash for
their securities, they will be unable to delay the resale of securities
into the United States even where the U.S. secondary market under-
values the securities. In particular, the pressure to resell quickly into
the United States is greatest for foreign investors acting as simple
conduits for U.S. issuers. Such investors typically have a large per-
centage of their capital tied into the offering and expect to recover
their capital immediately after resales into the United States occur.106
Delay in resale exposes such conduits to an undiversified risk that the
Regulation S securities may drop in value as well as increases the op-
portunity cost from other more valuable uses for the capital. Investors
seeking to act as conduits for U.S. issuers are therefore least able to
take advantage of an imperfect market reaction to news of the Regu-
lation S offering.
Thus, only in situations where foreign investors both (a) enjoy an
informational advantage over the U.S. secondary market and (b) are
able to take advantage of this information by choosing not to sell into
the United States where the U.S. market undervalues the issuer’s se-
curities may foreign investors gain at the benefit of U.S. investors
when the market reacts with some degree of inaccuracy to news of an
offshore offering.
B. Managers Acting Opportunistically
Managers seeking to use Regulation S offerings for their own
private benefit represent an entirely different class of harm for U.S.
investors.107 Regulation S offerings and resales driven by the over-
106. In the United States, underwriters in a firm commitment offering serve a similar con-
duit function for public offerings. In a firm commitment offering, underwriters purchase the se-
curities from the issuer and then attempt to resell the securities into the public market. Because
underwriters bear the risk of not selling the securities, the large fee they demand is in part com-
pensation for this risk. Cf. Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability
in Initial Public Offerings, 39 J.L. & ECON. 545, 556-57 (1996) (reporting that underwriters from
a sample of 952 initial public offerings from 1981 to 1984 received a mean 7% discount on the
offering as their compensation plus underwriter expenses).
107. Firms where managers hold less than 100% of all the equity may suffer from an agency
cost problem. To the extent that managers own only a fraction of the equity, they do not capture
the full benefit from actions that increase overall shareholder welfare. Therefore, managers may
seek to divert value from the shareholders and to their own individual use; in the alternative,
managers may simply choose to slack and not maximize shareholder welfare. See, e.g., Eugene
F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288-89 (1980)
(recommending the manager have a stake in the success of the organization); Eugene F. Fama
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valuation of the issuer’s securities in the U.S. secondary market bene-
fit all pre-offering shareholders in addition to foreign investors.108
Regulation S offerings conducted solely for the benefit of managers,
in contrast, transfer value away from pre-offering shareholders and
toward the issuer’s managers. Offshore securities offerings designed
to benefit managers may take one of at least two possible forms: (1)
transactions involving sales of discounted securities to entities in
which insiders own an equity interest or to block shareholders willing
to support opportunistic insiders in return for the discounted securi-
ties (collectively termed “insider self-dealing” transactions) and (2)
transactions that raise a suboptimal amount of capital for the issuer
but nevertheless provide managers benefit (“suboptimal capital in-
vestment” transactions).
1. Insider Self-Dealing Transactions. Insiders may force a
company to sell securities abroad through a Regulation S offering to
facilitate discounted sales to themselves or related parties. Insiders
may also use a discounted Regulation S offering to transfer value to a
particular block shareholder in return for the block shareholder’s
support of management. Several anecdotal instances of insider self-
dealing through Regulation S exist. For example, in 1997 Cheniere
Energy, Inc. sold securities through Regulation S to an overseas
investor using Investors Administration Services, Ltd. as its
placement agent.109 One of the principals of the placement agent was
the brother of the Chairman of Cheniere Energy.110 Insiders at two
NASDAQ small capitalization companies, Comprehensive
Environmental Systems, Inc. and ICIS Management Group Inc., were
indicted for criminal violations of the securities laws after selling
stock through Regulation S to entities controlled by the insiders and
& Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301 (1983)
(showing concern for organizations where the decisionmakers do not “bear a substantial share
of the wealth effect of their decisions”); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-
10 (1976) (noting that managers of corporations do not possess the same interest in the firm that
they would have if in a partnership or sole proprietorship).
108. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2 (discussing the gain to pre-offering shareholders of an
issuer selling overvalued securities into the market).
109. See Cheniere Energy, Inc., Form 8-K Current Report, Item 9 (Aug. 27, 1997), available
at http://www.freedgar.com (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
110. See id.
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then directing the sale of these securities to brokerage accounts in the
U.S. owned by the insiders.111
Where the offering discount is due to insiders engaging in self-
dealing, Regulation S may pose a threat to the interests of U.S. inves-
tors. Of course, insiders may engage in self-dealing through dis-
counted sales of securities to related entities domestically. Indeed, in-
siders may use other mechanisms to extract value from a company
other than securities self-dealing; for example, an insider may divert a
corporate opportunity for her own use.112 Nevertheless, Regulation S
provides a particularly effective means of facilitating insider self-
dealing to the extent that investors have more difficulty in tracing the
identity of purchasers across the borders of multiple countries in an
offshore securities offering.
Consider Texon, Inc. again. Assume now for simplicity that the
pre-offering U.S. secondary market price is $70 per share, exactly
matching the company’s fundamental value. The market, in other
words, does not overvalue Texon’s securities. Managers, nevertheless,
may benefit through a Regulation S offering to the extent that they
engineer a sale to entities in which the managers themselves have an
ownership interest. Suppose that Jane is the CEO of Texon. Jane sets
up an offshore entity called Sailboat Ltd., taking a 100% equity inter-
est in Sailboat. Sailboat purchases one million shares of Texon
through a Regulation S offering at $40 per share, well below the pre-
offering fundamental value of $70 per share. As a result of the steeply
discounted offering, Texon’s post-offering fundamental value drops
to only $55 per share.113 If Sailboat is able to resell into the United
States prior to information disclosure on the offering at the pre-
offering secondary market price of $70, Jane will gain $30 per share at
the expense of both new U.S. purchasers and pre-offering Texon
shareholders. Even where the secondary market reacts accurately to
111. See Former SEC Lawyer, Others Indicted on Charges Over Reg S Securities, 28 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. 1242, 1242 (1996). Similarly, the chairman and CEO of Members Services Corp.
was convicted of securities fraud after causing Members to sell 1.4 million shares of unregistered
stock under Regulation S to several entities controlled by the chairman. The chairman then sold
the Regulation S shares into the United States through the offshore entities into the United
States at a substantial profit. See SEC Announces First Conviction for ‘33 Act Regulation S Vio-
lations, 28 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 605, 605-06 (1996).
112. For a case discussing the diversion of a corporate opportunity by a corporate officer,
see Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter, 438 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982).
113. With the addition of one million shares sold at $40 per share, Texon gains $40 million in
additional capital, raising its total fundamental value to $110 million. With two million shares of
stock outstanding post-offering, Texon’s per share fundamental value will equal $55 per share.
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news of the offering and the market price drops to $55 per share to
reflect the post-offering fundamental value, Jane will still gain $15 per
share at the expense of pre-offering investors in Texon.114
2. Suboptimal Capital Investment Transactions. Managers may
utilize offshore securities offerings to benefit themselves at the
expense of pre-offering shareholders even without engaging in a
direct self-dealing transaction. Up to this point, this Article has
assumed that the issuer places all additional capital raised through a
securities offering in an interest-bearing bank account.115
Nevertheless, how the issuer actually uses the additional capital
affects the issuer’s valuation. Companies, for instance, may not
possess the capacity to employ additional capital productively. Worse
still, managers may divert some of the offering proceeds to their own
uses.116 Managers, for example, intent on increasing their own welfare
at the expense of shareholders, may expand the issuer’s business
unnecessarily.117 Similarly, managers may increase their own
compensation or expend resources for their own personal benefit,
including office accommodations, transportation, and other possible
expenses.118
For instance, assume that Texon’s management seeks to conduct
a Regulation S offering to raise funds in order to upgrade the corpo-
rate offices. An offering of one million shares at $70 per share, the
pre-offering fundamental value of the company, will result in a total
of $70 million with which managers can upgrade their corporate of-
fices. Assume that the cost of the upgrades is $20 million and that the
upgrades provide absolutely no benefit to the shareholders of the is-
suer. In this case, the issuer will have a post-offering total valuation of
$120 million and two million shares outstanding, giving a per share
114. Note that new U.S. purchasers, however, will not systematically be harmed to the ex-
tent that they pay the secondary market price after the market reacts to news of the offering.
The harm is solely on the pre-offering shareholders of Texon.
115. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
116. Companies may, of course, allocate offering proceeds to use for shareholder wealth-
increasing activities. For example, a company may use the offering proceeds to develop a new
product that generates large profits for the company.
117. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 62, at 705:
Because managers have only a small stake in the fortunes of the firm, these costs may
be quite high. Managers may not work as hard as they would if they could claim a
higher share of the proceeds—they may consume excessive perquisites, and they may
select inferior projects for the firm without bearing the consequences of their action.
118. See id.
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fundamental value of $60.119 Investors in the company thus lose $10
per share due to the Regulation S offering.
Several important observations may be noted regarding the pos-
sibility of suboptimal capital-raising activities on the part of manage-
ment. First, foreign investors that expect managers to engage in a
Regulation S offering simply to raise capital to serve the managers’
own personal needs will seek a larger offering discount. On average,
the discount must ensure that the foreign investors receive a competi-
tive rate of return on their investment. In the Texon example above,
foreign investors will not pay $70 when they expect that managerial
diversion of the proceeds from the offering will result in a post-
offering fundamental value of only $60 per share. Instead, foreign in-
vestors will pay no more than $50 per share, the price that ensures
foreign investors that the post-offering shares they receive will equal
the price they pay for the shares.120 A large Regulation S discount,
therefore, may represent the discount foreign investors demand in
situations where they expect managers to engage in suboptimal capi-
tal investments.
Second, regardless of whether foreign investors obtain a dis-
count, pre-offering U.S. shareholders in the issuer are harmed when
managers use a Regulation S offering to raise a suboptimal level of
capital. Significantly, however, the harm is not connected in any way
to the possibility of resales into the United States. Even where foreign
investors never resell into the United States, the fact that a large
number of shares with identical voting, liquidation, and dividend
rights are issued in return for capital that managers may squander re-
sults in harm to pre-offering shareholders. In other words, the harm
to pre-offering U.S. shareholders comes from the diversion of the of-
fering proceeds for the benefit of management; no additional harm
comes from resales of the issued securities into the United States.
119. Under assumptions of the hypothetical, Texon starts with a total pre-offering funda-
mental value of $70 million. The offering raises an additional $70 million. After subtracting the
$20 million wasted on the office upgrades, the post-offering total fundamental value equals $120
million.
120. If foreign investors pay $50 per share, Texon will raise a total of $50 million from the
offering. After taking into account the $20 million office-upgrade expenditure, the total valua-
tion of Texon will equal $100 million. Given two million outstanding shares post-offering, the
per share fundamental value will equal $50.
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C. Other Causes for Concern
A separate concern may exist that Regulation S offerings simply
occur at too great a discount, benefiting foreign investors at the ex-
pense of U.S. investors. Some may argue that, as a matter of fairness,
U.S. investors should also have the ability to purchase the issuer’s se-
curities at the same discounted prices as foreign investors.121 Several
responses to this claim are possible, however.
First, much of the discount may be related either to managerial
self-dealing or the overvaluation in the U.S. secondary market of the
issuer’s securities. For a large discount due to managerial self-dealing,
the real problem is not the discount itself but the frequency of mana-
gerial self-dealing. Targeted reform, as discussed later in this Article,
aimed at managerial self-dealing may be more effective in protecting
investors than simply imposing restrictions on Regulation S resales in
general.
Similarly, discounts due to overvaluation in the U.S. market may
not necessarily be harmful to U.S. investors. Where the discount sim-
ply compensates foreign investors for the expected drop in secondary
market prices prior to resales into the United States, the discount
does not harm U.S. investors but instead ensures that foreign inves-
tors do not systematically lose on their investments.122 Without such
an assurance, foreign investors may choose not to invest. On the
other hand, where the discount represents the negotiated share of the
overvaluation surplus foreign investors receive for assisting issuers to
sell overvalued securities into the United States, the discount does
harm U.S. investors. Whether U.S. investors are harmed therefore
depends on the timing and accuracy of the market reaction to news of
a Regulation S offering.
Second, the discount may not be related to either managerial
self-dealing or overvaluation of the issuer’s securities in the U.S. sec-
ondary market. Compensation, for instance, may be required for the
illiquidity that foreign investors bear during the Regulation S re-
stricted period.123 Where, for example, only a small fraction of an is-
suer’s capital stock is sold overseas, foreign investors may be forced
121. See Jordan, supra note 34, at 86 (“[M]any American investors have perceived these dis-
counts as providing an unfair market advantage to foreign investors.”).
122. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
123. See Offshore Offers & Sales, supra note 10, at 9639 (“The size of that price discount
reflects, at least in part, the compensation buyers of shares receive for giving up the ability to
readily sell the shares immediately in the public market.”).
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to resort to the U.S. as a liquid market in which to conduct resales.
During the restricted period, therefore, foreign investors are effec-
tively locked into their securities investment, unable to sell the securi-
ties for liquidity needs or rebalance their portfolio after a shift in the
market value of the securities.124
Foreign investors may also lack full information on the funda-
mental value of the issuer. As a result, foreign investors—like any
other investor—may face a mispricing risk that will result in over-
payment for the issuer’s securities. Rather than act as a conduit for an
issuer seeking to sell overvalued securities into the United States, for-
eign investors may become victims of overvaluation themselves. To
compensate for the mispricing risk, foreign investors will demand an
additional discount before agreeing to participate in the issuer’s
Regulation S offering.
Significantly, discounts designed to induce an investor to pur-
chase securities in the company do not necessarily harm pre-offering
shareholders of the company. In thinking about whether U.S. inves-
tors are harmed, it is important to consider the motivations of the is-
suing company’s management. Suppose again that Jane is the CEO of
Texon, Inc. Texon is considering a Regulation S offering to Saejoon, a
Korean-based investor unrelated to Jane. Moreover, assume that
Jane does not plan to divert any of the offering proceeds for her own
use. Under such circumstances, Jane will sell at below $70 per share,
the fundamental value of Texon, only where the benefit exceeds the
dilution cost to the pre-offering shareholders. Doing otherwise would
only dilute the pre-offering shareholders, including Jane herself to the
extent that she owns shares in Texon. Even if Jane were not an inves-
tor of Texon, she would face the negative reaction of her own share-
holders once information on the Regulation S discount is made pub-
lic.
Company management may be willing to offer a discount for the
issuer’s securities to compensate foreigners for the lack of liquidity or
the mispricing risk that foreign investors face because the issuer needs
to raise capital for a value-increasing project and the cost of issuing
securities inside the United States through a secondary offering is
greater. Issuing within the United States may result in a higher ex-
pected cost to issuers due to, for instance, the costs of complying with
124. The illiquidity risk, therefore, may be greater for more volatile securities to the extent
that such securities necessitate more constant portfolio rebalancing due to their rapid shifts in
value. Thanks to Jim Cox for this point.
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the registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act.125 Such
costs include not only the direct compliance expense but also the
prospect of potentially frivolous lawsuits filed against the issuer.126
Where the cost of frivolous lawsuits is high, issuers may consider a
discounted sale to foreign investors less costly than a registered sale
into the United States.127 Pre-offering shareholders in the issuer,
therefore, gain, despite the discount given to compensate foreigners
for illiquidity or mispricing risks, to the extent that the company’s
value increases from the additional source of capital available at a
cheaper cost than selling securities inside the United States.
III.  EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE REGULATION S OFFERING DISCOUNT
The magnitude of both the overvaluation and managerial oppor-
tunism risks to U.S. investors from a Regulation S offering correlates
with the size of the offering discount from the U.S. secondary market
price at the start of the offering. In the case of insider self-dealing, the
greater the discount, the more value that managers divert from pre-
offering shareholders. A larger discount may also represent compen-
sation to foreign investors for the managers’ planned suboptimal use
of the offering proceeds. In contrast, a large offering discount may
not indicate a corresponding harm to U.S. investors where the dis-
count is simply compensation to foreign investors unable to resell into
the United States until after the secondary market price responds
125. Studies have found that issuers going public for the first time inside the United States
that raise at least $10 million can expect expenses of 10% of the offering amount. See Jay R. Rit-
ter, The Costs of Going Public, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 269, 272-73 (1987). A good portion of these ex-
penses, nevertheless, go to non-regulatory expenses, such as the underwriter’s fee. Sara Hanks,
the former Chief of the SEC’s Office of International Corporate Finance who led the team that
drafted the original Regulation S, wrote:
It is no wonder that U.S. issuers favor a direct Regulation S transaction of this sort.
Transaction costs are approximately ten percent of those involved in a public offer-
ing, and the transaction can be completed in days. This timing advantage is especially
helpful where a company needs money fast to complete an acquisition, complete a
build-out, or simply stay solvent.
Hanks, supra note 7, at 313–14.
126. For example, in an earlier study, Bohn and Choi estimated that the expected cost of
settlement payouts for securities fraud class actions to all issuers engaging in an initial public
offering is equal to 1.1% of the offering amount. See James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the
New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 981
& n.215 (1996). Of course, to the extent that not all litigation is frivolous, the expected settle-
ment payout overestimates the cost to issuers of potential frivolous litigation.
127. For a study examining the cost of U.S. regulatory protection, see Stephen J. Choi, As-
sessing the Cost of Regulatory Protections: Evidence on the Decision to Sell Securities Outside
the United States (working paper, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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negatively to news of the Regulation S offering. An offering discount
that represents compensation for the illiquidity or mispricing risk
facing foreign purchasers does not necessarily result in harm to U.S.
investors. Where managers grant such a discount in an arms-length
negotiation and are not acting opportunistically, pre-offering share-
holders benefit more than they lose from the discounted sale. Section
A of this part discusses the evidence relating to the overvaluation risk
facing U.S. investors. Then, in Section B, this Article tests whether
factors related to insider opportunism in fact determine the discount
received by foreign investors in a Regulation S offering.
A. The Overvaluation Risk
Little empirical evidence exists on the efforts of domestic issuers
to sell overvalued securities into the United States indirectly through
a Regulation S offering. In a recent study of 192 Regulation S offer-
ings, Aggarwal, Gray, and Singer hypothesize that some offerings
prior to the SEC’s 1996 reporting reform were sold to foreign inves-
tors with enough lead time prior to the issuer’s subsequent Form 10-
Q filing to provide foreign investors with an option to resell into the
United States before the market received information on the offer-
ing.128 They find, among other things, that offerings with a pre-
disclosure resale option received a greater discount than offerings
that occur without a resale option.129
The Aggarwal, Gray, and Singer study, however, arguably suffers
from several flaws. First, the authors admit that the difference in the
discount they find between offerings sold with the option to resell
into the United States prior to information disclosure and those with-
out such an option is not statistically significant.130 Moreover, even if
the difference were statistically significant, this Article’s theoretical
discussion above calls into question the interpretation of a greater
128. See Reena Aggarwal et al., Capital Raising in the Offshore Market, 23 J. BANKING &
FIN. 1181, 1190-91 (1999); see also supra note 6 (listing Form 10-Q among the other periodic in-
formation disclosure filing forms). Among other things, the 1996 reporting reform required is-
suers to disclose information on equity-related Regulation S offerings within 15 days of the of-
fering. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (describing the SEC’s 1996 reporting
reforms).
129. See Aggarwal et al., supra note 127, at 1191 (reporting that offerings sold with the “op-
tion” to resell into the United States prior to the next scheduled Form 10-Q disclosure had a
mean discount of 35.77% in comparison to the mean discount of 20.00% at which offerings
without such an option were sold).
130. See id. at 1192.
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discount for offerings with a pre-disclosure resale option.131 Because
foreign investors will negotiate for a greater discount where they are
unable to sell prior to disclosure of the Regulation S offering, those
investors with a pre-disclosure resale option should receive a reduced
discount, all other things being equal.132 Second, Aggarwal, Gray, and
Singer’s pre-reporting reform sample suffers from sample bias to the
extent that their collection methodology misses many of the Regula-
tion S offerings. The authors look to only Form 10-Q filings to un-
cover pre-reporting reform issuers;133 however, issuers may disclose
the fact of a Regulation S offering through press releases and other
forms of SEC filings, including Form 10-K filings. The Aggarwal,
Gray, and Singer study, therefore, provides only inconclusive evi-
dence on the harm posed through Regulation S offerings.
In an earlier article, I also examine the issue of whether compa-
nies utilized Regulation S to sell overvalued securities into the United
States prior to the SEC’s 1996 reporting reform.134 After the 1996 re-
porting reform, one would expect a much-decreased ability on the
part of managers to use Regulation S to sell overvalued securities into
the United States. As discussed above, a small discount relative to the
overvaluation surplus may indicate that foreign investors are assisting
managers to sell overvalued securities into the United States.135 On
the other hand, a large discount equal to the overvaluation surplus
may indicate that no resales ahead of information disclosure are pos-
sible and that foreign investors are simply receiving compensation for
the expected drop in the market price they will bear.136 To the extent
that managers were successful in using Regulation S to resell overval-
ued securities into the United States prior to the 1996 reporting re-
form, one would expect a lower offering discount compared with the
post–reporting reform period, all other things being equal. The earlier
article reports that the mean and median offering discounts for
131. See supra Part II (discussing the relationship between the offering discount and the ex-
pected market reaction to news of the Regulation S offering).
132. The exact size of the discount depends on the relative bargaining powers of the issuer
and the foreign investors. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
133. See Aggarwal et al., supra note 128, at 1186-87. In addition, to the extent that an at-
tempted resale by a foreign investor itself signals information to the market, theoretically it is
unclear that the authors are correct in arguing that foreign investors that purchase well before a
Form 10-Q filing enjoy an option.
134. See Stephen Choi, Resales of Offshore Securities into the United States: Evaluating the
Overvaluation Risk to U.S. Investors 78 WASH. U. L.Q. (forthcoming Summer 2000); see also
supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (describing the SEC’s 1996 reporting reforms).
135. See supra Part II.
136. See id.
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Regulation S offerings are not statistically different between the pre-
and post–reporting reform periods, providing evidence against the
hypothesis that managers were able to engage in overvaluation-driven
Regulation S offerings prior to the SEC reporting reforms.137 Even
controlling for changes in the illiquidity and mispricing risks that in-
vestors bear, the discount did not increase post–reporting reform.138
Significantly, the Aggarwal, Gray, and Singer study and my ear-
lier work both focus on the ability of foreign investors to resell ahead
of a U.S. market reaction to the Regulation S offering prior to the
SEC’s 1996 reporting reform.139 After the reporting reform, the in-
creased information on Regulation S offerings disclosed to the mar-
ket prior to resales enables the market to adjust the price for possible
overvaluation.140 To the extent that the 1996 reporting reform reduced
the risk of overvaluation resales for U.S investors, the risk of insider
opportunism became relatively more significant in assessing the de-
sirability of the SEC’s subsequent tightening of the Regulation S re-
sale restrictions in 1998.141 The next section presents this Article’s tests
on the possibility of insider opportunism through Regulation S.
B. The Risk of Managerial Opportunism
Using a dataset of 701 equity and equity-related offshore offer-
ings from 1993 to 1997, this Article presents an empirical test of the
possibility of insider opportunism through Regulation S offerings.
This section first describes the Article’s dataset of Regulation S of-
ferings. Then the section reports on the empirical test of the presence
of insider self-dealing in Regulation S offerings.
1. Sample Description and Summary Statistics. Searches through
Exchange Act–reporting filing Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K on Lexis
and Westlaw as well as the SEC’s own Internet version of the
EDGAR database were conducted to identify Regulation S equity
137. See generally Choi, supra note 134 (reporting that the pre-reform offering discount for
non–Rule 144A offerings is 24.97% compared with 22.13% for the post-reform time period).
138. See id.
139. See Aggarwal et al., supra note 128, at 1185; Choi, supra note 134.
140. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the impact of an accurate market reaction to news of a
Regulation S offering); supra Part II.A.4 (discussing the impact of an inaccurate market reaction
to news of a Regulation S offering).
141. See supra Part II.A.3 (noting that a Regulation S offering may be motivated by a desire
to maximize the wealth of present shareholders); supra Part II.A.4 (describing ways in which
insiders may use Regulation S offerings to their own advantage).
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offerings from January 1, 1993, to December 31, 1997.142 Press releases
and articles in the Wall Street Journal were also searched using the
PR-Newswire and Wall Street Journal databases on Westlaw.
The resulting dataset contains two major limitations. First, only
firms subject to the periodic reporting requirements of the Exchange
Act were included due to data constraints.143 Because of the limitation
to only Exchange Act–reporting companies, this Article’s empirical
findings may not apply to smaller, non-Exchange Act–reporting issu-
ers, including issuers that are not listed on a national securities ex-
change and that fail to meet the SEC’s minimum net asset and num-
ber of shareholders requirements for Exchange Act reporting
status.144
Second, prior to the 1996 reporting reform,145 issuers disclosed in-
formation on the offering in one of their SEC filings or financial
statements only to the extent that the offerings were “material” to the
understanding of some other required information disclosure item.146
For example, some issuers disclosed information on Regulation S of-
ferings in their required discussion on capital resources under Item 7
of the annual Form 10-K filing.147 Regulation S offerings prior to the
reporting reform, therefore, comprise only a subset of the entire uni-
verse of Regulation S offerings. This subset, moreover, may be biased
toward offerings where the issuer believed that disclosure of the of-
fering outweighed any negative effects from disclosure. Nevertheless,
due to the materiality requirement for SEC filings, the search uncov-
142. See Form 8-K, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,001 (Oct. 6, 2000); Form 10-Q, 5 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,033 (Feb. 24, 1999); Form 10-K, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,101
(Feb. 24, 1999). The SEC’s online version of the EDGAR database is located on the Internet at
EDGAR Database of Corporate Information, http://www.sec.gov (last visited Nov. 10, 2000) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
143. See supra note 25 (describing the requirements for Exchange Act–reporting compa-
nies).
144. See id.
145. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (describing the 1996 changes in disclosure
requirements).
146. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2000) (stating that the registration statement also requires
“such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading”).
147. Exchange Act–reporting companies must make an annual Form 10-K filing with the
SEC. See supra note 6 (describing the periodic disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act).
Item 7 of Form 10-K, in turn, requires the disclosure of information described in Item 303 of
Regulation S-K. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303; Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operation, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,104 (Dec. 23, 1998). Issuers
may also voluntarily disclose their Regulation S offerings under Item 5 of Form 8-K to the ex-
tent that the offering is of sufficient “importance.” Form 8-K, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 31,003 (Oct. 6, 2000).
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ered the majority of larger size offerings. After the 1996 reporting re-
form, this Article’s search tracked all the Regulation S offerings
through the required Form 8-K disclosure.148
Table 1 reports the number of Regulation S offerings in this Ar-
ticle’s data sample by year for all the offerings in the sample and for
those offerings not part of a Rule 144A global offering.149 Rule 144A
offerings differ from stand-alone Regulation S offerings in a number
of important ways. Technically only a resale exemption, Rule 144A
provides purchasers of a Regulation S offering the ability to resell
purchased securities quickly to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs)
comprised mostly of large financial institutions.150 The prospect of an
immediate and liquid secondary market may result in a diminished
discount for Rule 144A-related Regulation S offerings.151 Rule 144A
prohibits securities sold under its provisions from consisting of the
same class of any security of the issuer listed on a U.S. securities ex-
change or traded on an automated U.S. interdealer quotation system,
such as NASDAQ (the “nonfungibility” requirement).152 Securities
convertible into a security that does trade on NASDAQ or a national
securities exchange are considered in violation of the nonfungibility
requirement unless a conversion premium of at least 10% is applied.153
148. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (describing the 1996 reporting reform).
149. The SEC estimates that, among Exchange Act–reporting companies, approximately
550 Regulation S offerings occur per year. See Offshore Offers & Sales, supra note 10, at 9639.
Thus, the data set collected represents only a subset of the total number of offerings. Neverthe-
less, so long as the subset is representative of the entire pool of Regulation S offerings, the re-
sults from the data set apply to the entire group of offerings.
150. Rule 144A(a)(1) of the Securities Act defines a Qualified Institutional Buyer as an in-
stitutional entity that “in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis at least $100
million in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the entity.” 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144A(a)(1)(i). Dealers registered pursuant to section 15 of the Exchange Act must meet
only a $10 million requirement. See id. § 230.144A(a)(1)(ii). For the securities of non-Exchange
Act–reporting issuers, the purchaser has the right to demand certain specified information at its
discretion. See id. § 230.144A(d)(4).
151. The PORTAL market provides QIBs a forum to execute and settle transactions in non-
registered securities pursuant to Rule 144A. For a particular issuer’s securities to trade in the
PORTAL market, the National Association of Securities Dealers must first grant their ap-
proval. See HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS,
POLICY, AND REGULATION 83-84 (4th ed. 1997) (describing the PORTAL market). Due in part
to the PORTAL market, the quantity of resales taking advantage of Rule 144A has grown dra-
matically. From eight placements totaling $916.0 million in 1990, the use of Rule 144A grew to
243 placements totaling $44.672 billion in 1993. See Staff Report on Rule 144A, [1994-1995 De-
cisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,428 (Aug. 18, 1994).
152. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3)(i).
153. See id.; see also Beller, supra note 45, at 179 (noting that the average conversion pre-
mium for Rule 144A offerings that include a tranche of securities issued under Regulation S was
“well above the 10% threshold required under Rule 144A”).
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Many of the Rule 144A offerings also involve concurrent placements
inside the United States and therefore more regulatory protections
for investors than purely overseas Regulation S offerings.
Table 1:
Number of Regulation S Offerings over Sample Time Period
Year
Number of
Offerings
Mean Offering
Amount
($ millions)
Median Offering
Amount
($ millions)
Market
Capitalization of
the Issuer
($ millions)
1993 30 195.0 16.9 1147.8
1994 88 15.2 2.3 204.8
1995 120 18.4 2.6 480.2
1996 249 28.4 2.2 218.1
1997 214 43.3 2.0 400.0
Total 701 36.6 2.3 356.1
Number of Non–Rule 144A Regulation S Offerings
Year
Number of
Offerings
Mean Offering
Amount
($ millions)
Median Offering
Amount
($ millions)
Market
Capitalization of
the Issuer
($ millions)
1993 21 104.9 7.0 174.1
1994 82 7.3 2.0 65.6
1995 109 6.1 2.2 326.4
1996 216 5.5 1.5 70.5
1997 174 7.7 1.5 101.4
Total 602 9.3 1.8 128.7
Note from Table 1 that Regulation S offerings in the 1993 por-
tion of the data sample were both small in number and had a signifi-
cantly larger mean offering amount relative to other years in the data
sample. Compared to the 1997 mean offering amount of $43.3 million,
the difference with the 1993 mean offering amount of $195 million is
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significant at the 5% confidence level.154 Two possible explanations
exist for this shift. First, in 1993 Regulation S issuers may have gener-
ally issued larger dollar amounts of securities. Second, as discussed
above, this Article’s data collection methodology may miss smaller
offering amount issuers in 1993. This Article, therefore, cannot rule
out the possibility of data sample bias for the pre–SEC reporting re-
form years.
In Table 2, below, five different types of equity and equity-
related securities offerings are tracked:155 (1) common stock, (2) non-
convertible preferred stock, (3) convertible preferred stock, (4) con-
vertible debt securities, and (5) other types of equity-related securi-
ties (including warrants).
Table 2:
Breakdown of Regulation S Offerings by Security Type
Security
Number
of
Offerings
Percent
of Total
Reg S
Offerings
Mean
Offering
Amount
($ millions)
Median
Offering
Amount
($ millions)
Common 378 53.9% 7.18 1.50
Preferred Nonconvertible 4 0.6 6.13 7.50
Preferred Convertible 102 14.6 60.96 4.19
Debt Convertible 209 29.8 69.50 5.38
Other 8 1.1 52.93 35.49
Total 701 100.0 36.43 2.28
The majority of offerings in the dataset are for common stock.
However, common stock offerings tend to be for a smaller offering
amount, with a mean of $7.18 million. As Table 3 below reports,
companies that trade on NASDAQ tend to engage in a greater pro-
154. Put another way, no greater than a 5% chance exists that the 1997 and 1993 offering
amounts are drawn from the same underlying distribution. The statistical significance of the dif-
ference between the 1997 and 1993 mean offering amounts was assessed using a two-sided t-test
of the means.
155. The original Regulation S did not provide a formal definition of “equity” security. In
application, debt securities that provided for conversion into an equity security within the one-
year restricted period for debt securities were considered as equity. Debt securities that pro-
vided for conversion only after the one-year restricted period for debt were not considered eq-
uity. See Lander, supra note 1, at 372-74. The conversion time period for all convertible debt
securities in this Article’s data set were examined to ensure that the conversion period occurred
prior to the end of the one-year restricted period.
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portion of the Regulation S offerings than those traded on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
Table 3:
Breakdown of Regulation S Offerings by Securities Exchange
Number of
Offerings
Percentage
of Total
Reg S
Offerings
Mean Offering
Amount
($ millions)
Percentage of
Offerings That
Were for
Common Stock
NYSE 89 12.7% 172.04 29.2%
AMEX 32 4.6% 6.84 78.1%
NASDAQ 578 82.7% 18.55 56.4%
Total 699 100.0% 36.48 53.9%
2. Testing the Presence of Managerial Opportunism. The degree
of harm U.S. investors face from managerial opportunism depends on
the magnitude of the offering discount. In the case of insider self-
dealing, a greater discount allows insiders to extract a large amount of
value per share from the pre-offering shareholders for the benefit of
entities in which the insiders own an equity interest.156
The dataset, in turn, provides significant evidence on a summary
statistic level that Regulation S offerings are sold at a substantial dis-
count relative to the secondary market price measured at the time of
the offering.157 Table 4 reports the mean and median offering dis-
counts for all common stock offerings and issues convertible into
common stock in the dataset. For common stock offerings, the offer-
ing discount is calculated directly from the offering price and the U.S.
secondary market price on the first date of the offering. For offerings
of securities convertible into common stock, the conversion price into
156. Even with a small discount, insiders may extract a large total amount of value from the
issuer and to their own private accounts through an offering of a large quantity of securities to
entities in which the insiders own an equity interest. However, the offering of a large quantity of
securities may draw unwanted attention to the insider’s self-dealing activities.
157. The offering discount is defined as:
Offering Discount = Offering Price - U.S. Secondary Market Price at Start of Offering
U.S. Secondary Market Price at Start of Offering
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common stock is adopted as the Regulation S offer price.158 For issu-
ers that employ a conversion formula rather than a single conversion
price, this Article calculates a conversion price assuming that the sec-
ondary market price at the time of conversion equals the secondary
market price at the start of the offering.159 The offering discount is
then calculated based on the conversion price and the U.S. secondary
market price on the first date of the offering. Table 4 also reports the
mean and median offering discount for the subset of non–Rule 144A
Regulation S offerings in the sample.
Table 4:
Summary of the Regulation S Offering Discount
The Regulation S offering discount is calculated based on the U.S. secondary market
price at the start of the offering. The net discount is calculated only for common
stock offerings and issues convertible into common stock.
Type of Offering Observations
Mean
Discount
Median
Discount p-value
All Regulation S 476 -16.46% -20.00% 0.0000**
Non-144A 400 -23.74% -25.00% 0.0000**
** 5% level. p-value is from two-sided t-test of the difference of the mean from zero.
As Table 4 demonstrates, the offering discount for the entire
sample of Regulation S offerings was -16.46% relative to the secon-
dary market price at the start of the offering (significant at the 5%
level). For non–Rule 144A offerings, the offering discount is even
greater in magnitude at -23.74% (significant at the 5% level).
Despite the large size of the Regulation S offering discount, sev-
eral possible explanations exist other than insider opportunism. Sig-
nificantly, a large part of the discount may be related to the market
reaction to news of the offering. As discussed above, no statistically
significant evidence exists that foreign investors are able to use
158. The vast majority of convertible securities in the data set were sold through a Rule
144A offering. Due to the fungibility requirements of Rule 144A of the Securities Act, most
Rule 144A offerings consist of convertible debt securities that are convertible after a period of
time into the common stock of the issuer at a premium of greater than 10%. See supra note 151.
159. To the extent that the secondary market price at the time of conversion is systemati-
cally greater than the secondary market price at the start of the offering, for example, this Arti-
cle’s measure for the conversion price will understate the true conversion price. This Article, as
a result, may overstate the offering discount for the securities of such issuers.
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Regulation S to engage in resales of overvalued securities into the
United States prior to information disclosure.160 After the 1996 re-
porting reform, the ability of foreign investors to resell prior to in-
formation disclosure into the United States is severely curtailed.
Thus, particularly in the post–reporting reform period, the offering
discount incorporates compensation to investors for the secondary
market price drop due to disclosure of the Regulation S offering.
Significantly, the part of the offering discount that represents
compensation for the secondary market reaction simply provides for-
eign investors with a competitive rate of return for their investment.
Without the discount, foreign investors that resold securities into the
United States after the secondary market reaction would systemati-
cally receive a negative return, leading foreign investors to eschew
Regulation S offerings. Foreign investors, in turn, may receive a
greater than competitive return—for example, due to managerial self-
dealing—only to the extent that the offering discount they receive ex-
ceeds the secondary market reaction.161
To measure the discount foreign investors obtain in excess of the
secondary market reaction, this Article subtracts the secondary mar-
ket price reaction to news of the offering from the offering discount
resulting in the “net discount.” Figure 1 graphically depicts the rela-
tionship of the offering discount with the net discount.
160. See supra Part III.A (describing empirical evidence on the ability of foreign investors to
resell into the United States ahead of information disclosure of the Regulation S offering).
161. This result again assumes that foreign investors are unable to resell prior to the secon-
dary market reaction to news of the offering. This assumption is strongest for the post–reporting
reform time period.
Figure 1: Offering and Net Discounts from a Regulation S Offering
Market price at start
of offering
Market price after
disclosure of the Reg-
ulation S offering
Regulation S offering price
Offering Discount
Net Discount
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The net discount represents the discount foreign investors actu-
ally receive when they resell their securities into the secondary mar-
ket after the market learns of the offering. To the extent that the sec-
ondary market reaction to news of the Regulation S offering is on
average correct, the net discount therefore represents the discount
foreign investors obtain from the issuer’s post-offering fundamental
value. The net discount, for example, may consist of a discount due to
insider self-dealing, a discount for illiquidity, and a discount to com-
pensate foreign investors for the risk they might misprice the issuer’s
securities. This Article uses the net discount in particular to test for
the presence of managerial opportunism.
At least two possible criticisms are possible of the use of the net
discount in the Article’s empirical models. First, removing the market
reaction component of the offering discount in generating the net dis-
count may also remove that part of the offering discount that repre-
sents the post-offering drop in value due to the suboptimal use of
capital raised from the offering. Where managers intend simply to
waste all the Regulation S offering proceeds, for example, the post-
offering fundamental value of the company’s shares will fall. Once the
market learns of the offering, the secondary market reaction will then
take into account the manager’s intention to waste the offering pro-
ceeds. Because the net discount focuses only on the offering discount
in excess of the secondary market reaction, the net discount provides
a means only to test for the presence of insider self-dealing and not
the suboptimal investment of capital.162
Second, because the offering discount is determined prior to the
actual secondary market reaction, the net offering discount investors
expect to receive depends on the expected secondary market reaction
at the time investors are negotiating the offering discount. Although
on average the actual secondary market reaction will equal the ex-
pected secondary market reaction, for any particular offering, the two
may not equal. To correct for this possible bias, the expected secon-
dary market reaction is modeled directly in the Appendix and used to
162. Managerial self-dealing sales of highly discounted securities may also reduce the value
of the corporation. The reduction in corporate value will, in turn, reduce the value of the shares
the managers purchase from the corporation. The net offering discount, therefore, represents
the net amount of value managers extract from the corporation. For example, consider Texon.
Where managers sell one million shares at $50 per share to themselves, the value of the Texon
shares will drop to only $75 per share from their original $100 per share. Managers then benefit
only $25 per share from their self-dealing, equal to the net offering discount.
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calculated the net discount. As the Appendix reports, the results us-
ing the net discount based on the expected secondary market reaction
are similar to the results for the net discount calculated using the ac-
tual secondary market reaction.
a. Determining the Secondary Market Reaction. This Article
assesses the secondary market reaction to news of a Regulation S
offering through event study methodology.163 Where the market for a
particular company is efficient, the secondary market price will
incorporate publicly announced information rapidly into the stock
market price.164 Examining the U.S. secondary market reaction to the
offering, therefore, provides a means of gauging how the disclosed
information affects shareholder welfare.165
To calculate the impact of the Regulation S offering on the sec-
ondary market price of a security, this Article utilizes the following
steps. First, this Article selects an event time window for when infor-
mation on the Regulation S offering reaches the U.S. secondary mar-
ket. This Article tracks the returns from the start of the offering to
both six weeks and eight weeks after the start as a match to the forty-
day restricted period relevant for offerings during this Article’s sam-
ple time period.166 Because the forty-day restricted period is measured
from the close of the offering,167 Regulation S may limit resales even
after six weeks from the start of the offering, depending on the dura-
163. See JOHN Y. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 149–78
(1997) (describing methods of event study analysis); Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner,
Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1985) (examining how
the characteristics of daily stock returns affect event study methodologies for determining the
share price impact of firm-specific events); A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and
Finance, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 13, 27 (1997) (using event study analysis to examine the null hypothe-
sis, which holds that an economic event has no impact on the distribution of returns from
stocks).
164. This Article’s restriction of its data sample to only Exchange Act–reporting companies
provides support for the efficient market assumption.
165. Event study methodology is often used to gauge the wealth effects of new information
on shareholders. See Jean-Claude Bosch et al., The Competitive Impact of Air Crashes: Stock
Market Evidence, 41 J.L. & ECON. 503 (1998) (analyzing stock market reactions to new informa-
tion about commercial air crashes); Eugene Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New
Information, 10 INT. ECON. REV. 1 (1969). For examples of event studies in the legal literature,
see ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW passim (1993).
166. Prior to the SEC’s 1998 reforms, U.S. Exchange Act–reporting issuers that sought to
sell equity abroad through Regulation S faced a 40-day restricted period. See Original Regula-
tion S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (c)(2)(III) (1990). Domestic U.S. issuers seeking to sell equity securi-
ties through Regulation S now face a one-year distribution compliance period. See supra note 32
(describing the distribution compliance period requirements).
167. See Original Regulation S, Rule 902(m), 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(m).
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tion of the offering. The eight-week event period is used to capture
the information effects for longer duration offerings. In addition, this
Article tracks returns from two weeks before the start of the offering
to both six weeks and eight weeks after the start date to assess the in-
formation effect from any pre-offering announcements to the market.
Prior to the SEC’s 1996 reporting reforms, Regulation S issuers
faced no specific requirement that they disclose their Regulation S of-
ferings.168 Thus, investors would learn of the offering only when re-
sales commenced in the United States after the forty-day restricted
period.169 Conversely, information about the Regulation S offering
may have reached the U.S. equity markets earlier than the six-week
and eight-week event windows for offerings that occurred after the
1996 reporting reform.170 For post-reporting reform offerings, never-
theless, this Article’s event windows capture disclosures from issuers
slow to meet their obligation to report their Regulation S offerings.171
For issuers that report their offerings in a timely manner, expanding
the event window to time periods where no significant information is
released to the market will, on average, not change the cumulative
excess return. On the other hand, the standard error will increase,
leading to a lower likelihood that the cumulative excess return will be
statistically significant. To the extent that this Article finds a substan-
tial market reaction post-reform using the six-week and eight-week
event windows, therefore, the results are even more significant.
Second, daily secondary market common stock returns are col-
lected from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) for
each Regulation S offering.172 Looking at the secondary market re-
turns during the event window, however, may provide a misleading
168. See supra notes 146-46 and accompanying text (discussing materiality and other re-
quirements that may have led issuers to disclose their Regulation S offering despite no specific
disclosure mandate).
169. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (2000). Indeed, foreign investors have, in the past, sold into the
United States prior to the expiration of the 40-day waiting period. In 1996, for example, the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers Regulation Inc. fined Alex, Brown & Son for assisting
resales back into the United States before the end of the 40-day period. See National Ass’n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc.: Alex Brown, Rep Agree to Fines over Sale of Regulation S Securities, 28 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1217 (Oct. 4, 1996).
170. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
171. For example, XXSYS Technologies Inc. conducted a $2 million common stock Regula-
tion S offering on March 18, 1997, but did not file a Form 8-K reporting on the offering until
May 16, 1997, almost two months after the offering. XXSYS Technologies, Inc., 8K Current Re-
port (May 15, 1997), available at http://www.freeedgar.com (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
172. The Center for Research in Security Prices is based at the University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business.
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picture of the impact of a Regulation S offering on the market price.
Without any new information, investors will expect an equity invest-
ment to provide a risk-adjusted return equivalent to other substitute
investments (the “expected return”). To separate the return due to
the information effect from the expected return, this Article estimates
the expected return for each issuer’s common stock based on the
market model.173 The daily excess return is then defined to equal the
unadjusted secondary market return minus the expected return; the
excess return, therefore, represents a measure of the information’s
impact on the stock price of the issuer for a particular day.
Finally, daily excess returns are summed across time in the event
window, giving the cumulated excess return (CER). The cumulated
excess return is taken as the market’s overall reaction to the new in-
formation. Table 5 reports the cumulative excess returns for the se-
lected event windows.
Table 5:
Cumulative Excess Returns from Event Study
(All Regulation S Offerings)
Time Window Observations CER t-statistic
+0 to +6 Weeks 382 -3.99% -3.177**
+0 to +8 Weeks 381 -5.36% -3.672**
-2 to +6 Weeks 379 -4.51% -3.628**
-2 to +8 Weeks 377 -6.00% -4.021**
** 5% level.
173. The market model treats the return for any security as a function of the total market
return. For security i, for example, the expected return for time period t (Rit) is equal to:
Rit =  + iRmt + it
where Rmt is the market return and it is the zero mean disturbance term. See CAMPBELL ET AL.,
supra note 163, at 155 (describing the market model). A value-weighted return based on all the
securities trading on the exchange in which the issuer’s securities are listed is used for the mar-
ket return. The value-weighted return for all NASDAQ securities is used for securities trading
on NASDAQ. For each security, returns from -260 trading days to -20 trading days prior to the
start of the offering are used to estimate the parameters of the market model.
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Cumulative Excess Returns from Event Study
(Excluding Rule 144A Offerings)
Time Window Observations CER t-statistic
+0 to +6 Weeks 300 -3.83% -2.311**
+0 to +8 Weeks 299 -5.11% -2.668**
-2 to +6 Weeks 298 -3.82% -2.221**
-2 to +8 Weeks 296 -5.27% -2.549**
** 5% level.
The event study provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis
that news of the Regulation S offerings convey significant negative in-
formation to the securities markets.174 Note from Table 5 that after a
Regulation S offering issuers receive a strong negative cumulative ex-
cess return on average relative to the market. In particular, for all
Regulation S offerings, the cumulative excess return is -5.36% for the
+0 to +8 week event window (significant at the 5% confidence level);
174. Analysts also have conducted an event study around information disclosure of a Regu-
lation S offering and find no statistically significant cumulative excess market return. See Ag-
garwal et al., supra note 128, at 1192-93. They focus, however, only on the filing date of the
Form 10-Q immediately after the Regulation S offering. See id. As discussed above, using the
Form 10-Q filing date is unreliable to the extent that information on the offering may reach the
market prior to the filing date. See supra notes 132-32 and accompanying text. In the alternative,
because issuers had no direct compulsion to disclose information on the offering in the Form 10-
Q prior to the SEC’s reporting reform, information on the offering may reach the market—
through an increase in trading volume, for example—well after the Form 10-Q filing date. This
Article’s larger event window, therefore, provides a more accurate representation of the time
period in which the market learns of the Regulation S offering.
Similar with this Article’s finding of a negative market reaction for Regulation S offer-
ings, Professors Kang, Kim, Park, and Stulz report a negative abnormal return to the an-
nouncement of an offshore convertible debt offering by a sample of U.S. issuers chosen to
match a corresponding sample of Japanese issuers of equity-related debt securities. See Jun-Koo
Kang et al., An Analysis of the Wealth Effects of Japanese Offshore Dollar-Denominated Con-
vertible and Warrant Bond Issues, 30 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 257, 264 (1995) (reporting a sta-
tistically significant abnormal return of –1.35% for offshore U.S. convertible debt issues).
In a study of equity private placements into the United States from 1979 to 1985, Pro-
fessor Wruck, in contrast, finds a positive secondary market reaction to news of an offering. See
Sophie Hopper Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private
Equity Financing, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 8-9 (1989). In particular, where share concentration in-
creases as a result of the offering, the secondary market reaction is even more positive. See id. at
10-23 (arguing that greater share concentration leads to both the increased monitoring of man-
agement and a raised probability of an eventual takeover). Wruck theorizes that private equity
placements typically involve fewer numbers of purchasers able to negotiate with management
for access to nonpublic information to gauge the value of the company. Private placement inves-
tors, therefore, face a reduced risk of purchasing overvalued securities; the public secondary
market, as a result, assesses a different probability of overvaluation from news of a private
placement than for a public offering. See id. at 10.
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similarly, for the -2 to +8 week event window, the cumulative excess
return is -6.00% (significant at the 5% confidence level).175 U.S. inves-
tors that owned a particular Regulation S issuer’s securities prior to
the offering were harmed as the information about the offering re-
sulted in a negative return. However, the harm is no different from
the harm from any other form of negative information disclosure.176
b. Insider Self-Dealing and the Net Offering Discount. The
net discount represents the amount below the post-disclosure
secondary market price at which foreign investors are able to
purchase an issuer’s Regulation S securities. To the extent that
foreign investors are unable to resell ahead of the secondary market
reaction to news of a Regulation S offering, during the post-reporting
reform period for example,177 the net discount represents the true gain
foreign investors receive at the expense of U.S. investors.
To calculate the net discount, this Article subtracts the eight-
week cumulative excess return from the offering discount in the
Regulation S offerings.178 Table 6 reports the mean and median net
discounts for all Regulation S offerings in the sample and the non–
Rule 144A offerings where data exists on both the offering discount
and the eight-week cumulative excess return.
175. Test statistics for significance based on the student-t distribution are calculated using
the method described in Brown & Warner, supra note 163, at 28-29.
176. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (arguing that the mere disclosure of truth-
ful, negative information into the U.S. market overall benefits the United States).
177. Even during the pre–reporting reform period, evidence is inconclusive as to whether
foreign investors could successfully resell prior to the secondary market reaction to news of a
Regulation S offering. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
178. In other words:
Net Discount = Offering Discount – 8-Week Cumulative Excess Return
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Table 6:
Summary of the Net Discount
The net discount is defined as the offering discount minus the eight-week cumulative
excess return. The net discount is calculated only for common stock offerings and
issues convertible into common stock.
Type of Offering Observations
Mean
Discount
Median
Discount p-value
All Regulation S 316 -4.00% -3.85% 0.1354
Non–Rule 144A 245 -13.63% -14.09% 0.0000**
** 5% level. p-value is from two-sided t-test of the difference of the mean from zero.
This Article tests the hypothesis that insider self-dealing is re-
sponsible for the magnitude of the net discount. Against this hypothe-
sis, this Article pits the alternative hypothesis that the net discount is
driven by illiquidity concerns as well as fears of mispricing the issuer’s
securities on the part of foreign investors due to the information dis-
advantage they face relative to the issuer.
To test among the different factors that explain the net discount,
a multivariate ordinary least squares model is fitted using the net dis-
count (NDISC) as the dependent variable. The model is represented
in the following equation:179
NDISC = 1 1 + X2 2 + X3 3 + X4 4 + X5 5
X1 – Liquidity-Related Variables
X2 – Mispricing Risk to Foreign Investors Variables
X3 – Insider Opportunism Variables
X4 – Control Variables
X5 – Geographical Location Variables
Several independent variables are included in the model to dis-
tinguish among the theoretical factors that may result in a net dis-
count. Table 7 summarizes the different independent variables.
179. In the model, α is the constant intercept term and ε is the zero mean stochastic dis-
turbance term.
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Table 7:
Description of Model Independent Variables
Category Independent Variable
X1: Liquidity-Related Natural log of market capitalization
Natural log of offering amount to market capitalization ratio
Number of world contacts
Natural log of market capitalization
Dummy variable for fraud action
X2: Mispricing Risk
to Foreign Investors
Dummy for SIC 357 (Computers and Office Equipment)
X3: Insider Opportunism Fraction of board comprised of officers
Fraction of common stock owned by directors and officers
Dummy variable for board seats obtained as part of the offering
Dummy variable for insider or block shareholder purchase
X4: Control Variables Dummy variable for common stock offering
Dummy variable for Rule 144A offering
X5: Geographical Location Dummy variable for sale to Europe
Dummy variable for sale to Canada
Dummy variable for sale to Asia
Dummy variable for sale to Central/South America
Dummy variable for sale to Other (including Africa)
First, to determine whether the overseas liquidity of a Regulation
S offering affects the discount which foreign investors demand, inde-
pendent variables (X1) related to overseas liquidity are added to the
model. The greater the market capitalization of an issuer, the more
likely that investors worldwide are familiar with the issuer, making it
easier for foreign investors to resell the securities abroad. Similarly,
the greater the offering amount sold overseas in relation to the total
market capitalization, the greater is the likelihood of a significant re-
sale market overseas. Where only a small fraction of an issuer’s out-
standing capitalization is sold abroad, for instance, trading activity
will gravitate back to the United States, where most securities are lo-
cated. The model therefore includes the natural log of the market
CHOI.DOC 01/31/01  8:23 AM
720 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:663
capitalization and the natural log of the offering amount to market
capitalization ratio as measures of overseas liquidity.180
Companies with more foreign contacts will also present investors
with a greater likelihood of finding investors abroad willing to trade
in the companies’ securities. Contacts overseas may take the form of
either factories or other productive enterprises abroad or overseas
export markets to which the company sells. To capture this possibil-
ity, the number of countries in which the firm either conducted opera-
tions or sold products and services is included in the model as the
“number of world contacts.” For each Regulation S issuer, the num-
ber of countries in which the firm either conducted operations or sold
products and services was collected through examination of each
firm’s SEC Form 10-K filing concurrent with the year of the offer-
ing.181
Second, a series of variables (X2) related to the risk foreign inves-
tors may face of mispricing the Regulation S securities are included in
the model. Where foreign investors purchase with a view to hold the
securities, for example, they face the risk that the securities are over-
valued. Where foreigners instead purchase with a view to resell into
the United States, they face a risk of mispricing the degree of over-
valuation in the United States, leading to too little compensation
from the issuer for the expected negative secondary market reaction
prior to resale. With a similar effect as for liquidity, a greater market
capitalization may result in an increased amount of information in the
market on the issuer. The greater an issuer’s market capitalization,
for instance, the more analysts that will follow the issuer, reducing the
mispricing risk to foreign investors.
In addition, to the extent that the issuer was involved in a private
U.S. securities fraud action, the issuer may represent a greater risk of
fraud to the overseas investors.182 Two measures for fraud are there-
180. The natural log transformation is used to obtain a more normal distribution for the
market capitalization and offering amount to market capitalization ratio independent variables.
181. This Article calculates the number of world contacts as follows: For each specific coun-
try mentioned in the Form 10-K filing, the number of world contacts is increased by one. Where
the issuer’s Form 10-K only discussed a particular continent, the average number of contacts
other issuers in this Article’s sample had in the particular continent conditional on the issuers’
having at least one contact is used as the number of contacts for that continent. For example, in
the entire sample, companies that listed at least one country in Europe on average listed five
European countries. Issuers that listed Europe, therefore, have their number of world contacts
increased by five.
182. On the other hand, not all fraud actions under the securities laws are merit-driven. See
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Ac-
tions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 500 (1991) (arguing that substantive and procedural legal rules, and
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fore included in all the models. A dummy variable for whether the is-
suer was involved in a private securities fraud action anytime from
ten years prior to the offering to three years after the offering is in-
cluded.183 Fraud actions occurring after the offering are included be-
cause issuers that actually are involved in a fraud action post-offering
may have displayed characteristics to foreign investors prior to the of-
fering that indicated a higher risk of fraud. Rational foreign investors,
in turn, should demand a greater discount to the extent that they per-
ceive an increased risk of fraud. As well, a dummy variable for Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC), code 357 (Computer and Office
Equipment)—the SIC Code with the highest frequency of securities
fraud class actions in the 1996 Bohn and Choi study of securities fraud
class actions related to initial public offerings184—is included in the
model.
Third, to test the hypothesis that insider self-dealing may drive
some of the offering discount, the model includes the fraction of cor-
porate officers on the board as well as the fraction of outstanding
shares owned by directors and officers as independent variables
(X3).185 Firms with a higher degree of insider board representation, all
other things being equal, will be more likely to sell securities to insid-
ers at a discount through an offshore offering.186 On the other hand,
firms where managers own a significant fraction of shares will be less
willing to bear the cost of selling discounted shares to the extent that
they bear a greater cost of this discount due to their share owner-
ship.187 Both the fraction of the board composed of officers as well as
the beneficial share ownership of directors and officers are included
economic incentives of the litigants, often drive suits brought under the securities laws); Bohn &
Choi, supra note 126, at 981 (discussing settlement costs in securities fraud class actions).
183. This Article tracked any private fraud action brought under the securities laws includ-
ing any action related to a securities offering or secondary market disclosure. To determine the
securities fraud experience of a particular issuer, Form 10-K, 8-K, and 10-Q filings were
searched on WESTLAW and LEXIS. For offerings that took place in 1997, fraud actions from
ten years prior to only two years after the offering were tracked.
184. See Bohn & Choi, supra note 126, at 942-43.
185. Both the beneficial ownership of directors and officers and the composition of the is-
suer’s board of directors were determined through examination of the issuer’s proxy statement
for the year of the offering.
186. Outside directors with some financial affiliation may tend to support management
more than outside directors without such affiliations. Thus, outside directors that also serve as
consultants, attorneys, or bankers to the company may act similarly with inside directors. This
Article’s focus on solely insider board representation, therefore, may not fully capture the de-
gree of management influence on certain boards of directors.
187. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing a possible nonlinearity in the re-
lationship between the share ownership of management and the net discount).
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in the model. In addition, the model includes dummy variables for
whether the purchaser obtained a board seat as part of the offering
and for whether the issuer voluntarily reported that an insider, affili-
ate of the insider, or a block shareholder purchased the securities.188
Fourth, the model incorporates a set of control dummy variables
(X4). A dummy variable is included for whether the offering was for
common stock to control for differences in risk for varying securities
with different voting, liquidation, and dividend rights in the issuer.
For securities that are convertible into common stock, the use of a
calculated offering discount based on the conversion price may also
reflect the offering discount inaccurately. For investors choosing to
convert, the conversion price does represent the price the investors
must pay for the common shares. Not all foreign investors, however,
may exercise their option to convert. In particular, the option not to
convert is valuable; the offering discount calculated from the conver-
sion price, therefore, may not represent the same price the foreign in-
vestor would have negotiated had the investor simply purchased
common stock from the issuer. For example, the investor may agree
to a higher conversion price in return for the option not to convert
(resulting in a reduced calculated offering discount). Nevertheless, to
the extent the Regulation S offering is being used to transfer value
from the company to corporate insiders, one would expect an in-
creased offering discount, even taking into account the potential op-
tion value built into the conversion price for convertible securities.
The model also uses a dummy variable to control for a Rule
144A offering.189 Because purchasers of a Rule 144A offering typically
enjoy the ability to engage in relatively inexpensive resale through the
PORTAL market to qualified institutional buyers, one would expect
a lower liquidity discount.190 As well, the presence of Rule 144A of-
ferings in the sample may skew the mean Regulation S discount. Rule
188. The dummy variables for the acquisition of a board seat and an insider purchase took
the value of 1 where data existed that confirmed such an event. Without any information, the
dummy variables were assigned a value of 0. A value of 0, therefore, may either indicate no such
event or a lack of data on the acquisition of a board seat or an insider purchase. Block share-
holders are defined as shareholders that beneficially own at least 5% of the company’s common
stock.
189. Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2000); see also supra note 150 (describing the re-
quirements of Rule 144A).
190. See supra note 151 (describing the PORTAL market). For a discussion of the liquidity
benefits of a Regulation S discount, see supra note 151 and accompanying text. In addition, to
qualify as nonfungible securities under Rule 144A, most Rule 144A–Regulation S offerings are
conducted at above a 10% offering premium, leading to a decrease mean offering discount for
the entire sample of Regulation S offerings. See supra note 150.
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144A offerings of convertible debt securities typically are sold with a
conversion right into the issuer’s common stock. The conversion pre-
mium, moreover, is usually set at above 10% relative to the U.S. sec-
ondary market price at the time of the offering to meet the nonfungi-
bility requirement of Rule 144A, resulting in a downward bias in the
mean discount for the pool of all Regulation S offerings.191
Model 1 of Table 8 reports the results for the baseline model. To
account for the possibility that foreign investors do not receive com-
pensation for the expected secondary market reaction during the pre-
1996 reporting reform period (and instead may engage in sales of
overvalued securities into U.S. markets), this Article re-estimates
Model 1 for the post–1996 reporting reform period only as reported
as Model 2 in Table 8. Because of the required disclosure of the
Regulation S offering within fifteen days to the U.S. securities mar-
kets in the post-reporting reform period,192 the ability to engage in re-
sales of overvalued securities is much diminished. The probability of
foreign investors demanding a greater offering discount to account
for information effects is therefore increased post reporting reform,
leading to a more accurate calculation of the net discount.
A variation of the model is fitted as Model 3 with the addition of
a series of dummy variables (X5) related to the geographical region,
where known, of the Regulation S offering (estimated for the post-
reporting reform period only). The geographical region of the offer-
ing may impact the offering in several ways. Certain geographical re-
gions have more robust and liquid capital markets. Geographical re-
gions also differ in the amount of securities regulatory protections
given to investors.193 As well, foreign investors bear a foreign ex-
change risk when they purchase shares of U.S.-denominated securi-
ties. The magnitude of both the illiquidity and foreign exchange risks,
moreover, will depend on the specific country in which the securities
are being sold. Offerings into countries with relatively stable foreign
currencies and large liquid capital markets will result in a reduced
191. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (describing the nonfungibility require-
ment for Rule 144A resales).
192. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (describing the 1996 reporting reforms).
193. Not all regulations result in a reduction in the offering discount. For example, in the
United States, underwriters and issuers may agree to underprice securities relative to the ex-
pected secondary market price to reduce the risk of a frivolous lawsuit associated with the of-
fering. See, e.g., Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN.
789, 798-800 (1988) (explaining underwriters’ and issuers’ efforts to avoid overpricing securities
so as to avoid potential legal liability). To the extent that different countries vary in their risk of
a frivolous lawsuit, one would expect a different level of discounting.
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level of residual price discount. Dummy variables for offerings to
Canada, Asia, Central/South America, and “Other” (including Af-
rica) regions are included in the model to compare against offerings
to Europe. Table 8 reports the results from Model 3.
Table 8:
OLS Model of the Net Discount
The net discount is defined as the offering discount minus the 8-week cumulative
excess return. A more negative net discount corresponds to a larger discount from
the secondary market price. The net discount is calculated only for common stock
offerings and issues convertible into common stock.
Independent Variables
Model 1:
Base Model
Model 2:
Post-Reporting
Reform Only
Model 3:
Post-Reporting
Reform
Only With
Geographical
Controls
Natural Log of Market Capitalization 0.057** 0.084** 0.036
(2.607) (2.505) (0.598)
0.099** 0.145** -0.020Natural Log of Offering Amount to
Market Capitalization Ratio (4.538) (4.382) (-0.292)
Number of World Contacts 0.004 0.006 -0.003
(0.979) (0.942) (-0.323)
Dummy Variable for Fraud 0.089 0.081 0.785**
(1.620) (0.853) (2.961)
Dummy for SIC 357 0.055 0.098 0.209
(0.599) (0.779) (1.329)
-0.036 -0.232 -1.247**Fraction of the Board Composed of
Corporate Officers (-0.262) (-1.018) (-2.589)
0.231* 0.477** 1.242**Fraction of Common Stock Beneficially
Owned by Directors and Officers (1.750) (2.305) (2.693)
Dummy Variable for Board Seat Purchase -0.332* -0.639** -0.555**
(-1.864) (-2.791) (-2.796)
0.247 . .Dummy Variable for Reported Sale to
Insider, Insider Affiliate, or Block
Shareholder
(0.897)
Dummy Variable for Common Stock -0.146** -0.194** -0.087
(-2.647) (-2.276) (-0.573)
Dummy Variable for 144A Offering 0.060 -0.101 0.720**
(0.667) (-0.678) (2.439)
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Dummy Variable for Europe Base Base Base
Dummy Variable for Asia . . -0.380**
(-2.221)
Dummy Variable for Canada . . -0.245
(-0.773)
. . -0.201Dummy Variable for Central/South
America (-1.020)
Dummy Variable for Other . . 1.122**
(2.881)
Constant -0.084 0.057 -0.098
(-0.692) (0.326) (-0.295)
Observations 288 119 36
F-value 10.76** 8.02** 4.67**
Adjusted R2 0.272 0.373 0.595
** 5% level; * 10% level. F-value tests the joint hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal
zero.
Focus first on the liquidity-related factors. Model 1 presents the
baseline model without geographical controls, and Model 2 estimates
Model 1 for the post-1996 reporting reform period only. The two
models provide evidence that liquidity impacts the net discount that
foreign investors receive. In Models 1 and 2, the coefficients on the
natural log of the market capitalization and the natural log of the of-
fering amount to market capitalization ratio are positive (significant
at the 5% confidence level). The greater the fraction of securities sold
abroad and the larger the market capitalization of the issuer, the
smaller is the net discount granted to foreign investors. The coeffi-
cients on the natural log of the market capitalization and the natural
log of the offering amount to market capitalization ratio, however,
are insignificant for the geographical control model (reported as
Model 3) in Table 8.
In contrast, the models reported in Table 8 provide mixed evi-
dence on the hypothesis that the net discount represents compensa-
tion to foreign investors for the mispricing risk they bear. On the one
hand, no evidence exists that foreign investors require an increased
discount for the diminished level of U.S. regulatory protections they
receive for the offering. The coefficients on the dummy variable for a
securities fraud action are positive in all the models (and significant at
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only the 20% level in Model 1 and at the 5% level in Model 3). If any-
thing, therefore, the presence of a securities fraud action results in a
reduced discount for foreign investors. The reduced discount supports
the alternative hypothesis that the presence of a fraud suit indicates
that the issuer is leaving the U.S. regime to reduce the risk of frivo-
lous litigation and not to defraud foreign investors.194 Likewise, the
coefficient on SIC Code 357 (Computer and Office Equipment) is
positive in all three models, although significant at only the 20% level
in Model 3 and insignificant in Models 1 and 2. Issuers from SIC Code
357 tend to receive a lower net offering discount.
Note also that the coefficient on the market capitalization of the
issuer is both positive and significant at the 5% level in all Models 1
and 2 (although insignificant in Model 3). As discussed above, a
larger market capitalization may correlate with increased overseas li-
quidity for foreign investors, resulting in a reduced offering discount.
Issuers with significant market capitalization may also present foreign
investors with a diminished mispricing risk to the extent that more
analysts follow the activities of larger market capitalization issuers.
The positive coefficient on the issuer’s market capitalization is consis-
tent with both possibilities.
Finally, Table 8 reports evidence that issuers conducting a
Regulation S offering in situations where the risk of managerial op-
portunism is higher may correlate with an increased net discount. On
the one hand, greater director and officer beneficial share ownership
leads to a diminished discount. The coefficients on the fraction of
common stock owned by directors and officers are positive and sig-
nificant at the 10% level in Model 1 and the 5% level in Models 2 and
3. Greater insider holdings of common stock result in a greater cost to
management from engaging in self-dealing. The net discount, as a re-
sult, is reduced for issuers with greater insider holdings. As well, the
coefficient on the fraction of the board comprised of officers of the
issuer is negative and significant at the 5% level in Model 3 (insignifi-
cant in Models 1 and 2, however). The larger the fraction of insiders
on the board of directors, the greater is the likelihood that the issuer
194. See supra note 182 (describing the theory that issuers may face lawsuits not driven by
merit but rather by the desire of plaintiff’s attorneys to extract a settlement); see also Choi, su-
pra note 127 (providing evidence that U.S. issuers seek to conduct a Regulation S offering to
avoid the high cost of frivolous suits inside the United States).
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may engage in insider self-dealing, leading to a larger net discount as
a result.195
A possible nonlinearity, however, may exist in the relationship
between the common stock beneficial ownership of directors and of-
ficers and the net discount.196 In particular, increased director and of-
ficer share ownership at lower absolute levels of ownership may
lessen the vulnerability to insiders from shareholder complaints,
leading to a raised incentive to engage in insider self-dealing and a
greater net discount as a result. On the other hand, increased director
and officer share ownership at higher absolute levels of ownership
cause insiders to bear a greater fraction of the cost from actions that
dilute the value of pre-offering shareholders, resulting in a reduced
net discount. To control for this possibility, Model 2 in Table 8 is re-
estimated with the addition of a squared term for the director and of-
ficer beneficial share ownership. Not reported, the coefficient on the
director and officer ownership variable is negative but statistically in-
significant, while the coefficient on the squared term is positive and
significant at only the 20% level in the control model. The control
model’s results, therefore, are only weakly consistent with the hy-
pothesis that at lower levels of share ownership, management engages
in greater self-dealing activities through Regulation S offerings while
at higher levels, managers are deterred from self-dealing through the
dilution they incur on their own share ownership.
Where the Regulation S purchasers obtain a board seat as part of
the offering, they are also able to negotiate a larger discount. The co-
efficients on the dummy variable for the purchase of a board seat is
negative in all three models and is significant at the 10% level in
Models 1 for the entire sample and at the 5% level in Models 2 and 3
for the post–reporting reform period. The purchase of a board seat
may indicate that the purchaser and the issuer’s managers are en-
gaged in self-dealing. For example, the purchaser may act as the man-
agers’ agent, supporting the managers’ position in all board meetings
in return for a discounted price on their Regulation S shares. The new
board seat may also signal that the purchaser intends to provide valu-
195. Even where boards are more “independent,” several commentators have voiced doubt
about the ability of the board of directors to monitor the actions of managers. See Laura Lin,
The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and
Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 898-903, 914-17 (1996).
196. Cf. Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical
Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 311-14 (1988) (providing evidence for a nonlinear relationship
between management ownership and the stock market valuation of a firm).
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able monitoring services for which the purchaser is receiving compen-
sation through a discounted Regulation S offering price.197 On the
other hand, the coefficient on the dummy variable for a reported sale
to an insider, insider affiliate, or block shareholder is statistically in-
significant in Model 1. Managers, nevertheless, seeking to engage in
opportunistic self-dealing, may choose not to report such a sale.198 The
insignificant coefficient on the reported insider sale variable, there-
fore, does not necessarily provide evidence against the managerial
opportunism hypothesis. Models 2 and 3, as well, dropped the dummy
variable for a reported sale to an insider, insider affiliate, or block
shareholder, due to lack of data.
Finally, the geographical-region dummy variables reported in
Model 3 indicate that foreign investors price Regulation S securities
differently depending on the jurisdiction of the offering. Securities of-
ferings to Asia, Canada, and Central/South America receive a greater
discount compared to sales to Europe. The coefficient on the Asia
dummy variable is negative and significant at the 5% level; the coeffi-
cients on the Canada and Central/South America dummy variables,
however, are statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the coeffi-
cient on the dummy variable for the “Other” region (including Af-
rica) is positive and significant at the 5% level in Model 3. Offerings
to the “Other” region receive a reduced discount compared with
Europe.199
In summary, this Article’s empirical test provides limited evi-
dence that the net offering discount foreign investors obtain depends
on three key factors: (1) the illiquidity risk the investors bear during
the forty-day restricted period, (2) the risk to the foreign investors of
purchasing overvalued securities from the issuer, and (3) the incentive
of insiders to use Regulation S offerings to engage in self-dealing. In
addition, the geographical region in which the offering takes place af-
fects the mean offering discount.
197. For example, the purchaser may monitor managers to align their incentives with the
general shareholders.
198. Item 701 of Regulation S-K does not mandate the disclosure of the purchaser’s specific
identity in a Regulation S offering. Issuers need only disclose the “class” of purchasers. See 17
C.F.R. § 229.701 (2000); see also infra notes 221-21 and accompanying text (providing examples
of companies making only very general references to their class of purchasers).
199. As a further control, Model 2 of Table 8 was re-estimated with the addition of year
dummy variables. None of the year dummy variables, however, was statistically significant.
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IV.  POLICY CONSEQUENCES
Regulation S offerings may inflict two distinct harms on U.S. in-
vestors. First, managers may employ a Regulation S offering to sell
overvalued securities indirectly into U.S. markets, resulting in a trans-
fer of value from U.S. purchasers to both the issuer and foreign inves-
tors acting as conduits for the issuer.200 Second, managers acting
purely out of self-interest may make a discounted Regulation S of-
fering to entities in which they have an ownership interest; managers
may also sell discounted securities to a block shareholder in return for
that shareholder’s continued support of management’s self-interested
activities. Alternatively, managers may attempt to raise a suboptimal
level of capital.201 Through such opportunistic behavior, managers are
able to transfer value from the pre-offering shareholders of the issuer
to themselves.
Nevertheless, not all Regulation S offerings pose either the
threat of overvalued securities or managerial opportunism to U.S. in-
vestors. Similarly, not all Regulation S offerings that involve a large
discount to the U.S. secondary market price harm U.S. investors. A
large Regulation S offering discount, for instance, may be due to li-
quidity factors or the risk that foreign investors face of mispricing se-
curities from the issuer.
Despite the specific nature of the dangers facing U.S. investors,
the SEC chose in 1998 to pursue a set of untailored reforms designed
to tighten the Regulation S exemption for all U.S. issuers. The direct
prohibitions against resales into the United States for a one-year
holding period combined with the various certification, legending,
and stop-transfer requirements certainly work to discourage overval-
ued resales into the United States.202 A considerable amount of new
information on an issuer may emerge during one year; furthermore,
any previously confidential information may be released during the
year. Foreign investors, therefore, will be unlikely to maintain any in-
formational advantage over the market after the one-year waiting pe-
riod. Insiders may still gain from a heavily discounted Regulation S
sale to entities in which they own an interest; waiting one year, how-
ever, increases the likelihood of detection as well as the liquidity risk
200. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the gain to the issuer from selling overvalued securi-
ties to U.S. purchasers through Regulation S).
201. See supra Part II.B (discussing how insider opportunism may result in a Regulation S
offering to the detriment of U.S. investors).
202. See supra Part I (describing the restrictions on resales imposed through Regulation S).
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insiders bear for that year, reducing the expected gain from self-
dealing.203
On the other hand, the limitations on resale do not adversely af-
fect managers that opportunistically raise capital to exploit for the
managers’ own purposes rather than to enhance shareholder wel-
fare.204 The harm from a suboptimal capital investment results from
the initial sale to foreign investors and not from resales into the
United States. Once securities are sold to foreign investors and capi-
tal transferred to the issuer, managers may divert the capital for their
own purposes without regard to the one-year limitation on resales.
Because the number of outstanding shares increases post-offering,
U.S. investors are diluted regardless of whether the Regulation S
shares ever enter the United States.
The reforms, moreover, also discourage all other types of Regu-
lation S offerings including shareholder-wealth increasing offerings. A
U.S. issuer, for instance, seeking to sell equity securities into a foreign
country as part of a business expansion plan for the benefit of its
shareholders must nevertheless comply with the offering restrictions
and ensure that resales do not take place inside the United States for
one year. At the very least, the restrictive nature of the present
Regulation S raises the illiquidity risk foreign investors face and
thereby the discount they will demand from U.S. issuers. The cost of
capital to U.S. issuers, as a result, will increase. At the worst, such re-
strictions may completely eliminate foreign markets as a source of
capital for U.S. companies. For instance, many foreign exchanges ref-
use to list securities legended with Regulation S resale restrictions,
drastically reducing the ability of U.S. companies to conduct large
foreign public offerings through Regulation S.205
This part explores several alternative policy responses for regula-
tors that specifically address the risks a Regulation S offering poses to
U.S. investors. Four possible reforms are identified that fit within the
present securities regulatory framework: (a) information disclosure,
203. See Jordan, supra note 34, at 113:
A year provides more time for the market to realize that a stock is grossly overvalued;
and when it does, the market and the short-sellers in it will expose the stock for what
it is truly worth. A full year also allows more time for the SEC to spot an illegal ma-
nipulation in the works.
204. See supra Part II.B.2 (examining the incentive of managers to raise capital for their own
private purposes).
205. See, e.g., Beller, supra note 45, at 180-81 (describing the potentially high cost that the
legending requirement of Regulation S imposes on issuers seeking to have their securities listed
on a foreign exchange).
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(b) differentiation by issuer, (c) differentiation by type of overseas of-
fering, and (d) differentiation by geographical location of the Regula-
tion S offering.
A. Information Disclosure
Increased information disclosure may reduce the potential harm
that U.S. investors bear from both the overvaluation and managerial
opportunism risks resulting from a Regulation S offering. The effect
of information disclosure on both types of risks, nevertheless, differs.
1. Disclosure and the Overvaluation Risk. The overvaluation
risk U.S. investors face depends on the informational advantage a
company’s managers enjoy over the U.S. secondary market in
determining the value of the company’s securities. The greater the
informational advantage, the larger is the potential harm U.S.
investors may suffer in purchasing overvalued securities.206 Both the
nature of any information disclosure associated with the Regulation S
offering and the timing are important in determining the magnitude
of this harm. Where issuers disclose all nonpublic information on the
valuation of the company and do so in advance of any resales into the
United States, U.S. investors face the least amount of overvaluation
risk. Markets that react with 100% accuracy to news of a Regulation S
offering, for instance, completely insulate U.S. investors from the risk
of purchasing overvalued securities.207
Consider, however, the situation where less than full disclosure is
made. An issuer, for instance, may simply disclose the existence of a
Regulation S offering and nothing more. On average, nevertheless,
the secondary market’s reaction to this information should correctly
assess the value of this information. For any given security, however,
the market may either over- or underreact. As discussed above,
where the market reacts with some degree of inaccuracy, issuers and
foreign investors may still enjoy some opportunity to engage in the
sale of overvalued securities into the United States.208 Foreign inves-
tors may choose to resell securities into the United States, for exam-
206. A large informational advantage, for example, gives the issuer a greater ability to
choose to sell securities only when the secondary market overvalues the securities.
207. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the impact to U.S. investors from Regulation S resales
when the market reacts with 100% accuracy prior to the commencement of resales).
208. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing the benefit from an informational advantage where
the market reacts imperfectly to news of a Regulation S offering).
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ple, only when the market underreacts to news of a Regulation S of-
fering, leaving some amount of overvaluation in the market price.209
To lessen the informational advantage enjoyed by foreign inves-
tors reselling into the United States, regulators may therefore require
issuers to disclose not only the existence of the Regulation S offering
but additional information on the amount raised, the use of proceeds,
and the identity of the purchasers.210 In the alternative, regulators
could treat foreign investors after a Regulation S offering as tempo-
rary insiders, allowing resales into the United States but only to the
extent that the investors disclose any confidential information they
received from the issuer to the U.S. secondary markets.211
In addition to the nature of the information disclosure on the
Regulation S offering, the timing of the disclosure is also critical. In-
formation disclosure after foreign investors successfully resell all their
securities into the United States may increase the overall accuracy of
securities pricing inside the United States; however, the disclosure
will not protect U.S. investors purchasing the overvalued securities
from the foreign investors. Any information disclosure regulation
therefore must require timely disclosures ahead of any resales.
Moreover, for securities that fail to trade in an efficient market,212 dis-
209. But see supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing how liquidity concerns
may force foreign investors to resell into the United States even when the market overreacts to
news of a Regulation S offering and results in an undervalued market price).
210. The present information disclosure items under Item 701 of Regulations S-K and S-B
detail similar information items for a Regulation S offering. Item 701 of Regulation S-K, for ex-
ample, requires disclosure of the offering date, the amount of securities, the total offering price,
the use of proceeds, and the principal underwriters among other information. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.701 (2000). For a discussion of the SEC’s recent attempts to increase the amount of infor-
mation disclosure associated with a Regulation S offering, see infra notes 221-24 and accompa-
nying text.
211. To the extent that foreign investors are located abroad, however, regulators may en-
counter difficulties in both collecting evidence that the investors held an informational advan-
tage and enforcing any judgment against the investors. For a description of U.S. insider trading
prohibitions, see Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading
Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 329-48 (1998).
212. Several versions of the efficient market hypothesis exist. The semi-strong version of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis posits that the secondary market price of companies reflects
all publicly available information on the company. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Mar-
kets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (providing a survey of
theoretical implications of efficient markets and empirical testing of the efficient markets hy-
pothesis); see also Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud in the
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 911 & n.9 (“The empirical evidence to date (with
some exceptions) appears to establish the validity of the weak and semi-strong versions but not
the strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.”). The Article uses the term “effi-
cient market” to refer to a trading market that displays features of a semi-strong efficient mar-
ket.
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closure to the market in general may not be sufficient. Instead, disclo-
sure directly to U.S. purchasers may be required.
The SEC has endeavored to increase both the timeliness and the
amount of information on Regulation S offerings available to the U.S.
secondary markets. In 1996, the SEC imposed reporting requirements
on Regulation S issuers.213 Within fifteen days of the sale, issuers had
to report information, as detailed under Item 701 of Regulation S-K,
on the title and amount of securities sold, the date of the transaction,
the name of the placement agent or underwriter, the amount of con-
sideration received, among other items.214 The relatively short fifteen-
day disclosure requirement worked to reduce the informational ad-
vantage of foreign investors before resales could commence.
After December 31, 1998, however, the SEC stopped requiring
the disclosure of Regulation S offerings in Form 8-K.215 Instead, issu-
ers may now wait until their next scheduled periodic information fil-
ing with the SEC.216 For some issuers, a delay of up to one-quarter of
a year may therefore result before the market receives information on
the offering. The SEC has argued that the increased delay in informa-
tional disclosure imposes no additional cost on the U.S. markets. Be-
cause most foreign investors must now meet a one-year holding pe-
riod prior to reselling into the United States, the post-1998 disclosure
requirement still results in timely disclosure prior to the commence-
ment of resales.217
The SEC’s move toward less timely information disclosure nev-
ertheless does impose a cost on U.S. markets. In particular, timely in-
formation disclosure and resale restrictions act as substitute means to
protect U.S. investors. The longer the delay in information disclosure
on the Regulation S offering, the greater is the restricted period
Others have argued that markets are not efficient because of investor irrationalities and
cognitive limitations in processing information. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assump-
tions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 853-54
(1992) (noting that some economists, concerned with an apparent inability to validate the effi-
ciency model, have responded with alternative hypotheses such as “noise” pricing influences);
Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities
Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 648-50 (1995) (reporting skepticism on the part of financial
economists on the validity of the efficient market hypothesis).
213. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (describing the 1996 reporting reforms).
214. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.701, 249.368 (2000).
215. See supra note 50.
216. Both the quarterly Form 10-Q and annual Form 10-K filing requirements for Exchange
Act–reporting companies presently mandate disclosure of Regulation S offerings. See id.
§§ 249.308A, 249.310.
217. See id.
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regulators need to impose on foreign investors. A greater restricted
period, in turn, raises the illiquidity risk facing foreign investors and
thereby results in a larger offering discount, harming issuers and their
pre-offering shareholders through diminished capital costs. To the ex-
tent that a fifteen-day disclosure period sufficiently informs the mar-
ket to eliminate the overvaluation risk facing U.S. investors, little
need exists for a one-year restricted period and the corresponding
large illiquidity penalty placed on foreign investors.218
2. Disclosure and the Risk of Managerial Opportunism. In
contrast with the overvaluation risk, the danger of managerial
opportunism, whether through self-dealing or a suboptimal capital
investment, is reduced through a different type of information
disclosure. First, the risk from managerial opportunism is not directly
related to the general informational advantage managers possess over
the U.S. secondary market. Managers could enjoy no better
information on the overall valuation of the issuer than the secondary
market. Nevertheless, the managers will profit from a heavily
discounted sale to entities in which they own an interest through
Regulation S; managers may also benefit from the sale of discounted
securities to a block shareholder that promises to return the favor
through support of the managers’ opportunistic activities. Likewise,
managers without any informational advantage may choose to use the
offering proceeds for their own private benefit at the expense of the
issuer’s shareholders.
Several legal prohibitions exist against such opportunism. At the
level of state law, managers that use Regulation S to self-deal in
heavily discounted securities or engage in suboptimal capital invest-
ment violate their fiduciary duty to their companies and to the pre-
offering shareholders.219 Under federal securities laws, managers may
contravene insider trading restrictions to the extent that they resell
the Regulation S securities at a profit while still in the possession of
218. For another argument that no need exists to extend the Regulation S restricted period
past 40 days, see Hanks, supra note 7, at 328:
In modern securities markets, decisions are made on a shorter term than forty days.
Investments today are made on a fluid basis, and the holder of securities experiences
far greater risk in a few days than would have been experienced over forty days sev-
eral decades ago. In addition, distributions of securities come to rest in a much
shorter period than in earlier decades.
219. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 60, at 1053 (describing the duty of loyalty).
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nonpublic information.220 However, the effectiveness of these prohibi-
tions depends on uncovering the connection of managers to the for-
eign entities engaging in the Regulation S purchases in the case of
self-dealing, or alternatively, the use of proceeds for suboptimal capi-
tal investments.
Presently, the disclosure required under Item 701 of Regulation
S-K does not require the disclosure of specific purchaser identities.
Issuers may choose instead to disclose the “class” of purchasers.221 For
example, Sims Communications Inc. identified purchasers of its
Regulation S offering in 1997 as “two foreign investment funds.”222
Preferred Voice, Inc., similarly, identified purchasers of its Regula-
tion S offering as “three private foreign investors.”223 Alternatively,
the issuer may disclose a specific purchaser’s identity, but not the un-
derlying relationship between the purchaser and a corporate insider.
Insiders, for example, may use offshore dummy shell corporations to
conceal their interest in the purchasers of a Regulation S offering. To
combat problems of identification, regulators may wish to focus on
disclosures targeted at revealing the specific identities of the purchas-
ers of a Regulation S offering and, to the extent that the purchasers
are not individuals, the ownership of the purchasing entities. U.S.
regulators also could cooperate with regulators in other countries to
determine the identity of Regulation S purchasers.224
Similarly, more detailed disclosure on the use of proceeds may
lessen the risk of suboptimal capital investment to the extent that
managers face an increased risk of a fiduciary duty suit based on the
disclosure. Initially, Item 701 of Regulation S-K did not require the
disclosure of the use of proceeds for Regulation S offerings. In 1997,
the SEC amended Item 701 to require the disclosure of the use of
220. See Fried, supra note 211, at 329-48 (describing the prohibitions under U.S. securities
laws against insider trading).
221. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.701(b).
222. See Sims Communications Inc., 8-K Filing (Nov. 5, 1997), available at http://www.
freeedgar.com (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
223. See Preferred Voice, Inc., 8-K Filing (July 10, 1997), available at http://www.freeedgar.
com (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
224. The United States already has entered into a series of memoranda of understanding
agreements with other countries that provide for information sharing and assistance in enforcing
antifraud prohibitions across international borders. See Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralism, Bilat-
eralism, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Functionalism: A Comparison with Reference to Secu-
rities Regulation, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 89 (1994); see also James A. Kehoe,
Exporting Insider Trading Laws: The Enforcement of U.S. Insider Trading Laws Internationally,
9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 345, 359-62 (1995) (discussing the use of a memorandum of under-
standing in the area of insider trading).
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proceeds.225 Despite the amended Item 701, issuers may still disclose
their intended use of proceeds in only very general terms. For exam-
ple, Foodvision.com, Inc. conducted a Regulation S offering in 2000
to “thirty foreign persons” and reported that it planned to use its pro-
ceeds to fund “the Company’s operations during the quarter.”226 As
an alternative, regulators could require follow-up disclosures a speci-
fied time period after the offering from issuers indicating the actual
use of proceeds.
At one level, the timing of the disclosure concerning the pur-
chaser identity or the use of proceeds aimed at combating managerial
opportunistic use of Regulation S does not matter. Even where dis-
closure occurs after foreign entities engage in resales into the United
States, information on insider self-dealing or suboptimal capital in-
vestment will still enable pre-offering shareholders and the SEC to
pursue legal action against the company’s management. Management
that expects such a legal response, as a result, will have a reduced in-
centive to act opportunistically in the first instance.
Timely disclosure may nonetheless work to protect U.S. inves-
tors. Even where the secondary market price is not overvalued pre-
offering, the very offering itself may result in a overvalued market
price post-offering. Where managers divert corporate wealth to their
own accounts through self-dealing or suboptimal capital investments,
for instance, the per-share fundamental value of the company neces-
sarily drops.227 U.S. investors, therefore, again face the risk of pur-
chasing overvalued securities, even where the securities were not
overvalued pre-offering. Rapid disclosure provides a means of pro-
tecting U.S. investors from this additional overvaluation risk.
B. Differentiation by Issuer
The significance of information disclosure provides another pol-
icy lever for regulators to consider: the type of issuer conducting the
Regulation S offering. In particular, issuers with varying levels of
market capitalization may pose different risks to U.S. investors. In-
vestors possess numerous sources of information on large market
capitalization companies. A number of professional securities analysts
225. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.701(f); 62 Fed. Reg. 39,755 (1997).
226. Foodvision Com, Inc., Form 10-Q (May 18, 2000), available at http://www.freeedgar.
com (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
227. See supra Part II.B (describing the impact on shareholder welfare from managerial op-
portunism).
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may closely track companies with a relatively large market capitaliza-
tion.228 These analysts may have direct contact with company man-
agement, information from the company’s suppliers and customers,
and detailed research on the company’s competitors. In addition, Ex-
change Act–reporting companies, of which large market capitaliza-
tion companies make up a large subset,229 provide the market with pe-
riodic disclosures on the company’s financials, management, business,
and capital needs, among other things, through filings with the SEC.230
The informational advantage managers and foreign investors
may enjoy over the U.S. secondary market, therefore, is reduced for
the larger market capitalization issuers. Consequently, the degree of
overvaluation risk U.S. investors face from a Regulation S offering is
also reduced, regardless of any specific disclosure related to the of-
fering the issuer makes to the market. Even where the issuer fails to
disclose its Regulation S offering, because many financial institutions
are multinational, news of the offering may also find its way into the
United States for companies that the institutions track. If a broker for
Goldman Sachs learns of the existence of privately placed Xerox se-
curities in Germany, for example, information on this offering may
find its way back to New York–based Goldman Sachs analysts fol-
lowing Xerox.231 In addition, analysts will help transmit new informa-
tion to investors and other market participants. Analysts may engage
in arbitrage transactions, using their informational knowledge to
trade securities. The trades, in turn, will provide a signal to others in
the market about the analysts’ information. Analyst-driven arbitrage
trades will also reduce any deviations in the secondary market price
from the company’s fundamental value due to the price pressure re-
sulting from a large influx of Regulation S resales into the United
States.232
228. See supra note 48 (discussing the “Aircraft Carrier” releases definition of a Form B is-
suer).
229. Analysts follow only a relatively small subset of Exchange Act–reporting companies.
See COX ET AL., supra note 48, at 41.
230. Exchange Act–reporting companies must periodically disclose information on their
business and property, see 17 C.F.R. § 229.101, and provide financial data to investors, see id.
§ 229.301-2. In addition, among other items, Exchange Act–reporting companies must periodi-
cally provide information on their directors and executive officers, see id. § 229.401-2, and on
executive compensation, see id. § 229.402.
231. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of price pres-
sure due to the large increase in the supply of an issuer’s securities after resales of securities is-
sued pursuant to Regulation S commence).
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At the other end of the spectrum are companies with a relatively
low market capitalization. Rather than trade on an established ex-
change, such smaller companies typically trade, if at all, on the over-
the-counter “pink sheets” market in the United States.233 Due to the
small market capitalization, few analysts follow such companies, be-
cause the amount of possible trading profit does not justify the fixed
cost of research. Investors in the securities of small capitalization is-
suers, therefore, must typically conduct their own research and can-
not rely on the secondary market price to reflect accurately all pub-
licly available information on the company.234 Because many of the
small capitalization issuers are also not Exchange Act–reporting
companies, the market will not enjoy the informational benefits from
the periodic disclosure requirements. Investors, for example, may not
have up-to-date and audited financials. Little information may also
exist on the issuer’s line of business or the management of the is-
suer.235 As a result, U.S. investors will face a relatively larger informa-
tional disadvantage relative to the management of an issuer for
smaller capitalization companies. Even where regulators force spe-
cific informational disclosure on news related to the Regulation S of-
fering, the secondary market price may react both slowly and with a
great degree of inaccuracy in assessing the value of the company.
The differences in information available on large market capi-
talization and relatively unknown, smaller capitalized issuers provide
regulators a means of improving upon the present Regulation S. Sig-
nificantly, the original Regulation S promulgated in 1990 did make
such a distinction among issuers.236 Exchange Act–reporting compa-
nies under the original Regulation S were subject to less stringent re-
quirements in conducting a Regulation S equity offering, avoiding the
233. See 3 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 1.134 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the over-the-counter securities market as “a
group of markets in which broker-dealers transact business with the public as principals or
agents, dealing for the most part in securities not listed on any exchanges”); 3D id. § 23.10 (pro-
viding a description of the pink sheets market).
234. Cf. Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding the district
court’s determination that evidence on the presence of market makers and arbitrageurs for se-
curities that trade only on the “pink sheets” over-the-counter market is not enough to deem the
market efficient as a matter of law).
235. See supra note 230 (describing various information items that Exchange Act–reporting
companies must periodically disclose to the SEC and to the public securities markets).
236. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (reporting the SEC’s rationale behind distin-
guishing among Exchange Act and non-Exchange Act–reporting companies in the original
Regulation S). See generally Lander, supra note 1 (providing a summary of the original Regula-
tion S).
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certification, legending, and stop-transfer requirements of the present
Regulation S.237 In reforming Regulation S in 1998, the SEC did away
with almost all distinctions among issuers, despite the varying risks
posed.238
Targeting specific regulatory efforts at those issuers that pose the
greatest risk to U.S. investors both conserves scarce regulatory re-
sources and results in better protection for U.S. investors than treat-
ing all issuers alike. To the extent that smaller market capitalization
issuers pose the largest danger to U.S. investors, Regulation S should
impose relatively greater restrictions on such issuers. Regulators may
consider using Exchange Act reporting status as a proxy for the
amount of information the market possesses on any particular issuer;
in the alternative, regulators could use a more restrictive definition
focusing on the larger market capitalization companies only.239 In ei-
ther case, regulators should act to relax both the restricted period and
the offering and transactional requirements for companies on which
the market already possesses a large supply of information.
The SEC may argue that the Exchange Act reporting status for
issuers under Regulation S is irrelevant because the registration re-
quirements under the Securities Act already make a similar distinc-
tion.240 In particular, should the SEC move successfully toward com-
pany registration, larger, more well-followed issuers will have an
easier and lower-cost alternative to Regulation S; larger market capi-
talization issuers may simply register their company and never face
subsequent registration requirements when they issue new securi-
ties.241 Foreign investors may then freely engage in resales into the
237. See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(2) (1990) (providing Exchange Act–
reporting issuers offering equity through Regulation S the ability to do so without complying
with certification, legending, or stop-transfer requirements).
238. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing how the SEC’s 1998 reforms
removed many distinctions between Exchange Act–reporting issuers and other companies un-
der Regulation S).
239. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
240. Under the Securities Act, for example, issuers conducting a registered offering may file
a registration statement under Forms S-2 or S-3 instead of Form S-1 depending on, among other
factors, the net non-affiliated public float of the issuer’s securities in the market. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 239.12-13 (2000). Forms S-2 and S-3, in turn, provide issuers with the ability to incorporate
information by reference from previously filed Exchange Act–reporting documents. See id.
241. Most recently, the SEC’s Advisory Committee on Capital Formation issued a report in
1996 recommending a shift toward registering companies and not individual securities transac-
tions. See Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Proc-
esses, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,834, at 88,403 (July 24, 1996).
In 1998, the SEC issued its sweeping “Aircraft Carrier” release that proposed a partial imple-
mentation of company registration through relaxed information disclosure and gun-jumping
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United States immediately after the offering. Company registration,
however, suffers from at least one major flaw compared with Regula-
tion S. Company registration or, indeed, any simplified registration
procedure for large market capitalization issuers, locks U.S. issuers
into the U.S. securities regulatory regime even when issuing securities
abroad. In contrast, the premise of Regulation S lies in limiting the
territorial reach of U.S. securities regulation. Regulation S, therefore,
holds open the promise of some degree of securities regulatory choice
for issuers.242
C. Differentiation by Type of Offering Abroad
Given the importance of resales into the United States for at
least some of the risks facing U.S. investors from a Regulation S of-
fering, regulators may also wish to examine the type of offering that
takes place under Regulation S. In particular, the motivation and
ability of foreign investors to resell into the United States prior to the
U.S. secondary market reaction to the offering may depend on the
type of offering. For comparison purposes, consider two extremes: (1)
public offerings to a large number of investors abroad and (2) private
placements to a limited number of investors.
First, where a Regulation S offering involves a large public of-
fering abroad, the overvaluation and the insider opportunism risks
are greatly diminished. Even where no foreign securities regulatory
regime governs the overseas public offering, the sale of securities to a
broad audience of foreign investors will necessarily require publicity
on the part of the issuer to generate interest among the foreign inves-
requirements for large, seasoned, and well-followed issuers. See The Regulation of Securities
Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7606A, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86, 108 (Nov. 13,
1998).
242. Several commentators have argued for greater choice for issuers in selecting the securi-
ties regime that applies to transactions in their securities. See generally Stephen J. Choi & An-
drew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regula-
tion, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998) (advocating a system under which investors and issuers may
choose from among several competing regulatory regimes and arrive at an “optimal” level of
securities regulation); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (arguing that “disclosure choice in securities offerings promises to ex-
pand the methods and reduce the costs of capital formation by aligning disclosure . . . with ac-
tual investor information demands, not legislative or administrative assumptions”); Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
2359 (1998) (proposing a regulatory approach of “competitive federalism, under which firms
select their securities regulator from among the fifty states and the District of Columbia, the
SEC, or other nations”). But see Fox, supra note 71 (arguing against regulatory choice and in-
stead advocating that the home country of an issuer should regulate the disclosure regime for
the issuer regardless of where investors are located or transactions take place).
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tors.243 Through the action of multinational foreign intermediaries, in-
formation disclosed abroad will make its way into U.S. markets even
without any formal disclosure into the United States.244 In addition, to
the extent that a large number of foreign investors purchase securities
in the offering, the risk of resale into the United States is reduced.
Compared to the situation where only a few investors purchase secu-
rities abroad, foreign investors in a public offering have the option to
resell to one of the numerous other foreign investors familiar with the
public offering. A public offering, therefore, raises the probability of
an overseas liquid market for the issuer’s securities.
Viable counterarguments to this reasoning may be made. To the
extent that a larger amount of capital typically is raised through pub-
lic offerings, managers will have a greater ability to siphon value away
from the issuer’s shareholders for the managers’ own private needs
through suboptimal capital investments. On the other hand, the
greater amount of public information generated through an overseas
public offering will alert both foreign investors and, through the ac-
tivities of financial intermediaries, U.S. investors of the nature of the
offering. To the extent that a high probability exists of a suboptimal
capital investment, investors around the world will discount the price
of the securities prior to the offering and pursue potential legal reme-
dies against the managers.245 Likewise, managers may attempt to
make a sale of securities to themselves or related block shareholders
at discounted prices using a public offering as “cover” for their trans-
action.246 To the extent, however, that insiders must give all investors
in a public offering abroad the same price,247 they will also hesitate to
give unrelated investors the same large discount.
Second, Regulation S issuers may conduct sales to a relatively
small number of investors in a private offering. Such offerings present
U.S. investors with a greater overvaluation and insider self-dealing
243. Without publicity, for example, few investors abroad will know of the securities offer-
ing and will fail to participate as a result.
244. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing the multinational contacts of
Goldman Sachs).
245. See supra notes 219-18 and accompanying text (discussing possible legal remedies
against managers).
246. For example, an entity in which managers own equity may be one of numerous partici-
pants in the public offering.
247. Issuers, of course, may attempt to give different investors a varying purchase price.
Whether or not this practice is allowed depends on the securities regime of the jurisdiction in
which the Regulation S securities are sold. As well, giving different investors a varying price
may alert the market that insiders are engaged in self-dealing.
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risk than public offerings abroad. Managers, for example, may use a
private offering to engage in self-dealing. The small number of inves-
tors in the offering increases the probability that managers may suc-
cessfully keep the offering a secret. Similarly, managers who believe
that the issuer’s securities are overvalued in the U.S. secondary mar-
ket may use a small number of foreign investors in an attempt to re-
sell securities quickly in the U.S. to take advantage of the overvalua-
tion. The fewer the number of investors, the easier it is for managers
to conduct negotiations on how to allocate the overvaluation surplus.
Moreover, a lower likelihood exists that information of the offering
will filter its way into the United States prior to the commencement
of resales. Managers may also transmit confidential information on
the issuer’s valuation to foreign investors when only a small number
of investors are involved, increasing the risk that the foreign investors
may enjoy an information advantage over the market even after news
of the Regulation S offering is disclosed.248
Regulation S may therefore benefit from greater differentiation
based on the size and scope of the offshore offering. Significantly, the
differentiation the Article proposes for Regulation S offerings is ex-
actly the opposite of the distinction made for domestic public and pri-
vate offerings under the securities laws.249 Regulators may wish to re-
duce the limitations on resales as well as the different offering and
transactional restrictions for U.S. issuers that sell to a large number of
foreign investors abroad through Regulation S. Regulators could im-
plement a bright-line cutoff for the number of purchasers above
which issuers face fewer resales restrictions.250 To the extent that both
248. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing the harm to U.S. investors when the U.S. secondary
market reacts imperfectly to news of a Regulation S offering and foreign investors with superior
information resell only when the market continues to overvalue the securities). Where only a
few investors are involved in the Regulation S offering, however, the investors may face large
illiquidity and opportunity costs and thus engage in resales immediately into the United States
even where they have information that the U.S. secondary market price undervalues the securi-
ties. See supra notes 105-05 and accompanying text.
249. The U.S. securities laws provide for detailed mandatory information disclosure, height-
ened antifraud liability, and a controlled selling process for broad domestic public offerings. See
supra note 2 (detailing the registration process under U.S. securities laws). In contrast, domestic
private placements to a smaller number of investors receive far less regulation. For an example
of a particular private placement under the securities laws, see Regulation D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501-08.
250. Rule 506 of the Securities Act implements a similar bright-line rule cutoff for the num-
ber of purchasers allowed under its safe harbor for a private placement transaction. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (limiting issuers to no more than 35 “purchasers,” excluding investors
that qualify for “accredited investor” status). Significantly, whereas Rule 506 restricts issuers
seeking to sell above the cutoff number of purchasers, this Article argues that increased over-
seas liquidity and informational disclosures call for a reduction in the restrictions facing issuers
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the overvaluation and insider self-dealing risks to U.S. investors are
reduced, lowering the Regulation S restrictions presents no harm to
U.S. investors while decreasing the cost to issuers from such an of-
fering. U.S. investors as a group are then benefited through the de-
creased costs of raising capital abroad.
D. Differentiation by Geographical Location of the Issue
U.S. regulations dealing with Regulation S offerings do not oper-
ate in a vacuum. In the case of an overseas offering, the securities re-
gime of at least one other country will apply to the offering. The im-
pact of the foreign securities regime, of course, depends on the
specific requirements of the regime. Consider two opposite situations:
(1) where the foreign regime imposes no barriers to fraud or self-
dealing and (2) where the foreign regime applies similar requirements
as the U.S. regime dealing with information disclosure and routing
out managerial opportunism.
In situations where the foreign regime does not regulate securi-
ties offerings, U.S. regulators may have a valid concern that U.S. issu-
ers could use Regulation S to skirt U.S. regulatory prohibitions.251
Contrast this to offerings into jurisdictions where the foreign regime
is similar to the U.S. regime. For foreign regimes with a comparable
regulatory regime, the argument for restricting resales of Regulation
S securities into the United States becomes weaker. To the extent
that issuers seek to sell overvalued securities abroad, they will face
similar disclosure and antifraud prohibitions, deterring such action.
Similarly, where managers seek to engage in insider self-dealing, for-
eign prohibitions will deter insiders. Indeed, the coefficients on the
dummy variable for geographical location from Table 8 provide evi-
dence that foreign investors take into consideration the region in
which securities are offered in determining the offering discount. Of-
ferings into countries located in Asia, Canada, and Central/South
America, for example, tend to receive a greater discount than offer-
ings into Europe.252
that engage in a Regulation S offering involving above a specified minimum number of purchas-
ers.
251. On the other hand, providing issuers an ability to choose for themselves the securities
regime that applies to their offering may give issuers the ability to choose the set of protections
that best protect investors while placing regulatory competitive forces on countries to tailor
their regulations to maximize investor protection. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the possibility
of issuer choice in securities regulation).
252. Only the coefficient on the dummy variable for Asia, however, is statistically signifi-
cant. See supra notes 198-97 and accompanying text. Moreover, in the model for the net dis-
CHOI.DOC 01/31/01  8:23 AM
744 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:663
Foreign regulators, in seeking to enforce their securities regula-
tory regime on U.S. issuers, may face additional costs compared with
U.S. regulators. At a minimum, foreign regulators will have an in-
creased expense to gather information about the U.S. issuer.253 In
cases where the United States hinders enforcement of foreign judg-
ments against U.S. issuers, foreign regulators may fail at deterring
both securities fraud and insider self-dealing.
Regulators in the United States may wish to take into account
the specific country in which the U.S. issuer is selling securities
abroad in one of two ways. First, regulators may act to strengthen the
securities regimes of other countries as applied to U.S. issuers.
Through information exchange, U.S. regulators may assist foreign
regulators in collecting information on fraudulent or self-dealing ac-
tivities on the part of managers of U.S. companies. The United States,
for example, already has a number of memoranda of understandings
with different countries regarding insider trading investigations and
enforcement.254 Regulators may also require domestic issuers that sell
securities abroad to agree to abide with enforcement actions and civil
judgments from the foreign jurisdictions for actions stemming from
the offering.
Second, U.S. regulators may also vary the requirements of
Regulation S itself according to the foreign market in which the U.S.
issuer conducts sales of its securities. U.S. securities regulators could
make a substantive judgment that particular foreign regimes are
similar to the U.S. regime and then decrease the restricted period for
offerings to such jurisdictions and reduce the various transactional
requirements.255 Even where a foreign regime provides a lower level
of protection than the U.S. regime, to the extent that the foreign re-
count based on the expected secondary market reaction, none of the coefficients on the geo-
graphical region dummy variables are significant. See Appendix.
253. Note, however, that the Internet is reducing the cost of obtaining information on indi-
vidual issuers. For example, investors around the world may simply go to http://www.fool.com
for a variety of investor-related information on a large number of public companies.
254. See supra note 224 (describing the United States’ efforts at cooperation with other
countries’ securities regulatory regimes through memoranda of understandings).
255. The United States already does take into account the securities regime of one particu-
lar country: Canada. In 1991, the SEC adopted a multijurisdictional disclosure system for quali-
fied securities transactions involving a Canadian issuer into the United States. See Exchange Act
Release No. 6902, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,812, at 81,861 (June 21,
1991) [hereinafter Release No. 6902]. The multijurisdictional disclosure system allows Canadian
issuers to register a securities offering under the Securities Act while complying with Canadian
disclosure requirements to the extent that certain requirements are met including reconciliation
with U.S. G.A.A.P. accounting. See Exchange Act Release No. 7004, 58 Fed. Reg. 35,367 (1993).
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gime is nevertheless more stringent than other alternative jurisdic-
tions, the risk of resale and insider self-dealing are concomitantly re-
duced. Regulators, therefore, may benefit both issuers and investors
through a sliding-scale approach to regulation, imposing more strin-
gent resales restrictions for Regulation S offerings only into regimes
with relatively weaker securities regulatory protections.
Opponents may argue that U.S. regulators may find it too costly
to monitor the securities regimes of other countries. However, Regu-
lation S in part already recognizes the distinctions between different
offshore markets. The SEC has labeled certain overseas markets as
“designated overseas securities markets” for purposes of meeting the
offshore transaction requirement of Regulation S for resales under
Rule 904 of the Securities Act.256 To the extent that U.S. regulators al-
ready coordinate with other regimes in monitoring information on in-
sider self-dealing actions, the incremental cost of assessing the level of
investor protection provided through other regimes is reduced.257
V.  CONCLUSION
This Article analyzes the risks U.S. investors confront from the
use by domestic issuers of Regulation S to sell securities overseas. On
a theoretical level, the Article argues that U.S. investors face risks
from both the resale of overvalued securities into the U.S. market and
the opportunistic use of Regulation S by managers to engage in self-
dealing or suboptimal capital investment. The SEC’s 1996 reporting
reform greatly reduced the risk of overvaluation resales.258 As a result,
assessing the magnitude of the managerial opportunism risk assumes
a more critical significance following the reporting reform.
Looking to empirical data, this Article presents evidence that in-
sider self-dealing may partially drive the Regulation S offering dis-
count. Regulation S therefore may pose a risk to U.S. investors even
after the 1996 reporting reform. Evidence also exists that the discount
for Regulation S offerings may be attributed to the need to compen-
sate foreign investors for the illiquidity they bear during the Regula-
256. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h)(1)(ii)(B)(2). Rule 902(b), in turn, lists a number of desig-
nated offshore securities markets including the London Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change, and the Toronto Stock Exchange among others. See id. § 230.902(b).
257. See supra note 224.
258. Note, however, that the SEC’s 1998 Reforms increased the delay before issuers must
disclose information on Regulation S offerings. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text
(describing the SEC’s evolving requirement for issuers to disclose information on Regulation S
offerings).
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tion S restricted period as well as the risk foreign investors bear of
mispricing securities purchased from issuers.
Despite the continued risk of managerial opportunism, the SEC’s
subsequent 1998 reforms both provide an untailored response to op-
portunism and unnecessarily raise the cost of mitigating the separate
overvaluation risk. This Article instead recommends a more narrowly
tailored approach to combat the perceived risks facing U.S. investors
from a Regulation S offering. Rather than focusing specifically on re-
sales in the United States and extending the restricted period during
which resales may not occur, this Article argues that regulators
should instead turn to alternative regulatory devices.
Timely disclosure of information on the Regulation S offering,
including specific purchaser identities and more detailed information
on the use of proceeds, for example, may be sufficient to combat the
possible overvaluation and insider opportunism risk to U.S. investors
from the offering. To the extent that disclosure protects U.S. inves-
tors, regulators may then impose a shortened restricted period, re-
ducing the illiquidity premium issuers must transfer to foreign inves-
tors. Regulators may also wish to differentiate based on the type of
issuer, the size of the overseas offering, and the geographical region
of the offering. Taking a more targeted approach to regulating
Regulation S offerings allows offerings with a diminished risk of in-
vestor abuse to utilize foreign capital sources at a lower cost of capi-
tal, to the overall benefit of all U.S. investors.
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APPENDIX
The appendix provides an alternative specification of the net of-
fering discount offshore investors receive based on the expected sec-
ondary market reaction to the offering determined at the time the of-
fering discount is negotiated. To generate the expected secondary
market reaction, the appendix first estimates an ordinary least
squares model for the eight-week cumulative excess return. The
model of the eight-week CER includes five different types of inde-
pendent variables.
CER = 1 1 + X2 2 + X3 3 + X4 4 + X5 5
X1 – Informational Disadvantage Variables
X2 – Overvaluation-Related Variables
X3 – Managerial Incentive Variables
X4 – Use of Proceeds Variables
X5 – Control Variables
First, in X1 the model includes the natural log of market capitali-
zation as a measure for the informational disadvantage outside inves-
tors may find relative to management. Firms with a greater market
capitalization will attract a larger analyst following, reducing the in-
formational disadvantage of the market relative to insiders in the
firm. The less the informational disadvantage, the less reaction the
market will have to news of an offering.
Second, in X2 the model includes the natural log of the offering
amount to market capitalization ratio. The more overvalued manag-
ers believe the securities of the firm, the larger the quantity of securi-
ties managers will attempt to issue. The market will therefore inter-
pret a larger securities offering as a greater signal that the issuer’s
securities are overvalued, leading to a more substantial market reac-
tion.
Third, in X3 the model includes the fraction of corporate officers
on the board of directors and the fraction of shares beneficially
owned by directors and officers. The more insiders on the board of
directors, the greater ability managers will have to use an offering to
increase their own wealth at the expense of shareholders, generating
a more negative market reaction. Similarly, the more shares in the
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hands of managers, the less likely that managers will conduct an of-
fering that dilutes the value of the shares.
Fourth, in X4 the model includes controls for the issuer’s stated
use of proceeds for the offering. The market may value an offering
differently depending on the use of the offering. In particular, dummy
variables for whether the offering proceeds will be used for general
working capital, product development, capital expenditures, business
expansion, acquisitions, repayment of debt, or balance sheet–related
purposes are added to the model with general corporate purposes as
the base case. Where multiple uses are stated, only the first use is re-
corded; where no mention is made of the use of proceeds, the offering
is placed in the general corporate purposes category.
Finally, in X5 the model includes a set of various control vari-
ables. The number of world contacts,259 a dummy variable for whether
the offered security is common stock, and a dummy variable for
whether the offering is a Rule 144A–related Regulation S offering are
included in the model.
Not reported, the model for the eight-week CER is estimated for
the post-1996 reporting reform period only and had an adjusted R2 of
0.035. The coefficients obtained from the eight-week CER model are
used to predict the eight-week cumulative excess return for each
Regulation S securities issue in the dataset. The net discount is then
calculated as follows:
Net Discount = Offering Discount – Predicted 8-Week CER
Using the alternative calculation of the net discount, the appen-
dix then refits the three models reported in Table 8. The table below
reports the results of the three models:
259. See supra note 181 (describing how this Article calculates the number of world contacts
for each Regulation S issuer).
CHOI.DOC 01/31/01  8:23 AM
2000] THE UNFOUNDED FEAR OF REGULATION S 749
Appendix Table:
OLS Model of the Net Discount Calculated Using Predicted
Secondary Market Return
The net discount is defined as the offering discount minus the predicted eight-week
cumulative excess return. A more negative net discount corresponds to a larger dis-
count from the secondary market price. The net discount is calculated only for com-
mon stock offerings and issues convertible into common stock.
Independent Variables
Model A1:
Base Model
Model A2:
Post-Reporting
Reform Only
Model A3:
Post-Reporting
Reform
Only with
Geographical
Controls
Natural Log of Market Capitalization 0.050** 0.068** 0.027
(4.407) (4.257) (0.670)
0.145** 0.138** 0.079**Natural Log of Offering Amount to
Market Capitalization Ratio (12.423) (8.668) (2.296)
Number of World Contacts 0.005** 0.005* 0.003
(3.199) (1.798) (0.704)
Dummy Variable for Fraud 0.039 0.008 0.009
(1.167) (0.148) (0.073)
Dummy for SIC 357 0.100* 0.108 0.003
(1.720) (1.412) (0.025)
-0.142* -0.105 -0.433Fraction of the Board Composed of
Corporate Officers (-1.851) (-0.933) (-1.358)
0.104 0.318** -0.028Fraction of Common Stock Beneficially
Owned by Directors and Officers (1.388) (2.614) (-0.089)
Dummy Variable for Board Seat Purchase 0.022 -0.104 -0.044
(0.172) (-0.673) (-0.237)
-0.118 -0.316* -0.492*Dummy Variable for Reported Sale to
Insider, Insider Affiliate, or Block
Shareholder
(-0.950) (-1.675) (-1.848)
Dummy Variable for Common Stock -0.178** -0.199** -0.065
(-5.621) (-4.442) (-0.618)
Dummy Variable for 144A Offering 0.060 -0.004 0.205
(1.059) (-0.046) (1.117)
Dummy Variable for Europe . . Base
Dummy Variable for Asia . . 0.013
(0.109)
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Dummy Variable for Canada . . -0.196
(-0.859)
. . -0.120Dummy Variable for Central/South
America (-1.009)
Dummy Variable for Other . . 0.104
(0.393)
Constant 0.147** 0.073 0.231
(2.357) (0.888) (0.954)
Observations 415 184 63
F-value 45.34** 23.30** 2.54**
Adjusted R2 0.541 0.573 0.284
** 5% level; * 10% level. F-value tests the joint hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal
zero.
Similar to the results in Table 8, the Appendix Table provides
evidence that factors correlated with the incentive and ability of man-
agers to engage in insider self-dealing correlate with a greater net of-
fering discount. Note that in all three models the coefficient on the
fraction of the board comprised of corporate officers is negative. The
more insiders on the board, the greater is the net offering discount.
The coefficient, however, is significant at only the 10% level in Model
A1 and at the 20% level in Model A3; the coefficient is insignificant
in Model A2.
The fraction of common stock owned by directors and officers is
positive in Models A1 and A2 (significant at only the 20% level in
Model A1 and at the 5% level in Model A2). More shares in the
hands of directors and officers result in a greater dilution in value to
managers from any self-dealing activities, reducing their incentive to
engage in such activities. The positive coefficient in Models A1 and
A2 are consistent with this hypothesis. In contrast, the coefficient is
negative and statistically insignificant in Model A3.
As discussed in the Article, the relationship of the share holdings
of directors and officers with the offering discount may be nonlinear.
At lower levels of ownership, incremental increases in share holdings
may act to further entrench management and increase the level of
managerial self-dealing, leading to larger net discounts. To control for
this possibility, Model A2 is re-estimated with the addition of a
squared term for the director and officer beneficial share ownership.
In the control model, the coefficient on the director and officer own-
ership variable is negative and significant at the 10% level while the
coefficient on the squared term is positive and significant at the 5%
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level. The control model’s results, therefore, are consistent with the
hypothesis that at lower levels of share ownership, management en-
gage in greater self-dealing activities through Regulation S offerings
while at higher levels managers are deterred from self-dealing
through the dilution they incur on their own share ownership.
Finally, note that the dummy variable for whether the issuer re-
ported a sale to an insider, insider-affiliate, or block shareholder in
the Regulation S offering is negative and significant at the 10% level
in Models A2 and A3. A reported insider, insider-affiliate, or block
shareholder share purchase therefore correlates with a greater offer-
ing discount. The greater offering discount is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that insiders may use Regulation S to engage in self-dealing
transactions at the expense of pre-offering shareholders.260 Neverthe-
less, this Article cannot rule out the alternative hypothesis that large
discounts given to a block shareholder in particular may act as com-
pensation for the block shareholder’s continued monitoring of man-
agement for the benefit of all shareholders.
260. As an additional control, Model 2 was re-estimated using year dummy variables. None
of the year dummy variables were significant.
